

# ASSURANCE ACTIVITY REPORT

## Oracle Linux 7.6

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# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>1.1</b>	<b>EVIDENCE</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT ASSURANCE ACTIVITIES</b> .....	<b>2</b>
<b>2.1</b>	<b>CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT</b> .....	<b>2</b>
2.1.1	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (Refined).....	2
2.1.2	FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (Refined) .....	4
2.1.3	FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction .....	6
2.1.4	FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption (Refined) .....	9
2.1.5	FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation – Hashing (Refined) .....	13
2.1.6	FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation – Signing (Refined) .....	15
2.1.7	FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication (Refined).....	16
2.1.8	FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation .....	16
2.1.9	FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Sensitive Data .....	17
2.1.10	FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol .....	17
<b>2.2</b>	<b>USER DATA PROTECTION (FDP)</b> .....	<b>21</b>
2.2.1	FDP_ACF_EXT.1 Access Controls for Protecting User Data.....	21
<b>2.3</b>	<b>SECURITY MANAGEMENT (FMT)</b> .....	<b>23</b>
2.3.1	FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Management of security functions behavior .....	23
2.3.2	FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Specification of Management Functions .....	23
<b>2.4</b>	<b>PROTECTION OF THE TSF (FPT)</b> .....	<b>24</b>
2.4.1	FPT_ACF_EXT.1 Access Controls .....	24
2.4.2	FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 Address Space Layout Randomization .....	25
2.4.3	FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 Stack Buffer Overflow Protection .....	26
2.4.4	FPT_TST_EXT.1 Boot Integrity.....	26
2.4.5	FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update .....	27
2.4.6	FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Trusted Update for Application Software .....	28
<b>2.5</b>	<b>SECURITY AUDIT (FAU)</b> .....	<b>29</b>
2.5.1	FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation (Refined).....	29
<b>2.6</b>	<b>IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (FIA)</b> .....	<b>30</b>
2.6.1	FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling (Refined) .....	30
2.6.2	FIA_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms (Refined) .....	31



2.6.3	FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation .....	33
2.6.4	FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication .....	36
<b>2.7</b>	<b>TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS (FTP).....</b>	<b>36</b>
2.7.1	FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Trusted channel communications .....	36
2.7.2	FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path.....	36
<b>3</b>	<b>EVALUATION ACTIVITIES FOR OPTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.....</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>3.1</b>	<b>USER DATA PROTECTION (FDP) .....</b>	<b>38</b>
3.1.1	FDP_IFC_EXT.1 Information flow control .....	38
<b>4</b>	<b>EVALUATION ACTIVITIES FOR SELECTION-BASED REQUIREMENTS.....</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENT ACTIVITIES .....</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>5.1</b>	<b>ADV: DEVELOPMENT .....</b>	<b>39</b>
5.1.1	Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1).....	39
<b>5.2</b>	<b>AGD: GUIDANCE DOCUMENTATION.....</b>	<b>39</b>
5.2.1	Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1) .....	39
5.2.2	Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1).....	40
<b>5.3</b>	<b>ALC: LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT.....</b>	<b>40</b>
5.3.1	Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1).....	40
5.3.2	TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1).....	40
5.3.3	Timely Security Updates (ALC_TSU_EXT.1).....	41
<b>5.4</b>	<b>ATE: TESTS.....</b>	<b>41</b>
5.4.1	Independent Testing – Conformance (ATE_IND.1).....	41
<b>5.5</b>	<b>AVA: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT .....</b>	<b>42</b>
5.5.1	Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1).....	42
<b>6</b>	<b>ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR EXTENDED PACKAGE FOR SECURE SHELL (SSH).....</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>6.1</b>	<b>SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.....</b>	<b>42</b>
6.1.1	FCS_COP.1(1) /SSH Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption (Refined).....	42
6.1.2	FCS_SSH_EXT.1 SSH Protocol.....	44
<b>6.2</b>	<b>SELECTION-BASED REQUIREMENTS.....</b>	<b>45</b>
6.2.1	FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Protocol – Client.....	45
6.2.2	FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Protocol – Server .....	49



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### Common Criteria Versions

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security Functional Components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security Assurance Components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.

### Common Evaluation Methodology Versions

- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.

### Protection Profile

- Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.2.1, 22 April 2019
- Extended package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 19 February 2016

### NIAP Technical Decisions

ITEM	TECHNICAL DECISION TITLE
TD0578	<a href="#">SHA-1 is no longer mandatory</a>
TD0525	<a href="#">Updates to Certificate Revocation (FIA_X509_EXT.1)</a>
TD0501	<a href="#">Cryptographic selections and updates for OS PP</a>
TD0496	<a href="#">GPOS PP adds allow-with statement for VPN Client V2.1</a>
TD0493	<a href="#">X.509v3 certificates when using digital signature for Boot Integrity</a>
TD0463	<a href="#">Clarification for FPT_TUD_EXT</a>
TD0441	<a href="#">Updated TLS Ciphersuites for OS PP</a>



ITEM	TECHNICAL DECISION TITLE
TD0386	<a href="#">Platform-Provided Verification of Update</a>
TD0365	<a href="#">FCS_CKM_EXT.4 selections</a>

**Table 1 - NIAP Technical Decisions for PP\_OS\_v4.2.1**

ITEM	TECHNICAL DECISION TITLE
TD0446	<a href="#">Missing selections for SSH</a>
TD0420	<a href="#">Conflict in FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.1 and FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1</a>
TD0332	<a href="#">Support for RSA SHA2 host keys</a>
TD0331	<a href="#">SSH Rekey Testing</a>
TD0240	<a href="#">FCS_COP.1.1(1) Platform provided crypto for encryption/decryption</a>

**Table 2 - NIAP Technical Decisions for PP\_SSH\_EP\_v1.0**



# 1 Introduction

This document presents assurance activity evaluation results of the TOE evaluation. There are three types of assurance activities and the following is provided for each:

1. TOE Summary Specification (TSS) - An indication that the required information is in the TSS section of the Security Target;
2. Guidance - A specific reference to the location in the guidance is provided for the required information; and
3. Test – A summary of the test procedure used, and the results obtained is provided for each required test activity.

This Assurance Activities Report contains sections for each functional class and family and sub-sections addressing each of the SFRs specified in the Security Target.

## 1.1 Evidence

The following is a list of the documents consulted:

- [ST] Oracle Linux 7.6 Security Target, Version 4.0, 19 July 2021.
- [ENTROPY] Entropy Assessment Report, Version 0.5, 17 January 2020.
- [AGD] Oracle Linux v7.6 Common Criteria Guidance Document, Version 1.8, 19 July 2021.
- [PP\_OS\_v4.2.1] Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.2.1, 22 April 2019.
- [PP\_SSH\_EP\_v1.0] Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH) Version 1.0, 19 February 2016
- [CA\_PP\_OS] Configuration Annex to the Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Annex Release 1 For Protection Profile Version 4.2, 22 May 2018.



## 2 Security Functional Requirement Assurance Activities

This section describes the assurance activities associated with the SFRs defined in the PP and the results of those activities as performed by the evaluation team. The assurance activities are extracted from [PP\_OS\_v4.2.1] and [PP\_SSH\_EP\_v1.0].

### 2.1 Cryptographic Support

#### 2.1.1 FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (Refined)

##### 2.1.1.1 TSS Assurance Activity

The evaluator will ensure that the TSS identifies the key sizes supported by the OS. If the ST specifies more than one scheme, the evaluator will examine the TSS to verify that it identifies the usage for each scheme.

##### Evaluator Assessment:

Table 18 in Section 7 of the [ST] identifies the following:

RSA keys (2048, and 3072 bits) for key generation conforming to FIPS PUB 186-4 (TLS and SSH communications)  
FFC (2048 and 3072 bit) for key generation conforming to FIPS PUB 186-4 (part of key generation for TLS).

##### 2.1.1.2 Guidance Documentation Assurance Activity

The evaluator will verify that the AGD guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the OS to use the selected key generation scheme(s) and key size(s) for all uses defined in this PP.

##### Evaluator Assessment:

Section 5 and Section 6 of the [AGD] provides guidance on how to configure the TOE to use the selected key generation schemes and key sizes for all uses defined in this PP.

##### 2.1.1.3 Test Assurance Activity

Evaluation Activity Note: The following tests may require the vendor to furnish a developer environment and developer tools that are typically not available to end-users of the OS.

##### Key Generation for FIPS PUB 186-4 RSA Schemes

The evaluator will verify the implementation of RSA Key Generation by the OS using the Key Generation test. This test verifies the ability of the TSF to correctly produce values for the key components including the public verification exponent  $e$ , the private prime factors  $p$  and  $q$ , the public modulus  $n$  and the calculation of the private signature exponent  $d$ . Key Pair generation specifies 5 ways (or methods) to generate the primes  $p$  and  $q$ . These include:

1. Random Primes:
  - Provable primes
  - Probable primes
2. Primes with Conditions:
  - Primes  $p_1, p_2, q_1, q_2, p$  and  $q$  shall all be provable primes
  - Primes  $p_1, p_2, q_1,$  and  $q_2$  shall be provable primes and  $p$  and  $q$  shall be probable primes
  - Primes  $p_1, p_2, q_1, q_2, p$  and  $q$  shall all be probable primes

To test the key generation method for the Random Provable primes method and for all the Primes with Conditions methods, the evaluator must seed the TSF key generation routine with sufficient data to deterministically generate the RSA key pair. This



includes the random seed(s), the public exponent of the RSA key, and the desired key length. For each key length supported, the evaluator shall have the TSF generate 25 key pairs. The evaluator will verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation by comparing values generated by the TSF with those generated from a known good implementation.

If possible, the Random Probable primes method should also be verified against a known good implementation as described above. Otherwise, the evaluator will have the TSF generate 10 keys pairs for each supported key length  $n_{len}$  and verify:

- $n = p \cdot q$ ,
- $p$  and  $q$  are probably prime according to Miller-Rabin tests,
- $GCD(p-1, e) = 1$ ,
- $GCD(q-1, e) = 1$ ,
- $2^{16} = e = 2^{256}$  and  $e$  is an odd integer,
- $|p-q| > 2^{n_{len}/2 - 100}$ ,
- $p = 2^{n_{len}/2 - 1/2}$ ,
- $q = 2^{n_{len}/2 - 1/2}$ ,
- $2^{(n_{len}/2)} < d < LCM(p-1, q-1)$ ,
- $e \cdot d = 1 \pmod{LCM(p-1, q-1)}$ .

### Key Generation for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)

#### FIPS 186-4 ECC Key Generation Test

For each supported NIST curve, i.e., P-256, P-384 and P-521, the evaluator will require the implementation under test (IUT) to generate 10 private/public key pairs. The private key shall be generated using an approved random bit generator (RBG). To determine correctness, the evaluator will submit the generated key pairs to the public key verification (PKV) function of a known good implementation.

#### FIPS 186-4 Public Key Verification (PKV) Test

For each supported NIST curve, i.e., P-256, P-384 and P-521, the evaluator will generate 10 private/public key pairs using the key generation function of a known good implementation and modify five of the public key values so that they are incorrect, leaving five values unchanged (i.e., correct). The evaluator **will** obtain in response a set of 10 PASS/FAIL values.

### Key Generation for Finite-Field Cryptography (FFC)

The evaluator will verify the implementation of the Parameters Generation and the Key Generation for FFC by the TOE using the Parameter Generation and Key Generation test. This test verifies the ability of the TSF to correctly produce values for the field prime  $p$ , the cryptographic prime  $q$  (dividing  $p-1$ ), the cryptographic group generator  $g$ , and the calculation of the private key  $x$  and public key  $y$ .

The Parameter generation specifies 2 ways (or methods) to generate the cryptographic prime  $q$  and the field prime  $p$ :

#### Cryptographic and Field Primes:

- Primes  $q$  and  $p$  shall both be provable primes
- Primes  $q$  and field prime  $p$  shall both be probable primes

and two ways to generate the cryptographic group generator  $g$ :

#### Cryptographic Group Generator:

- Generator  $g$  constructed through a verifiable process





- Generator  $g$  constructed through an unverifiable process

The Key generation specifies 2 ways to generate the private key  $x$ :

Private Key:

- $\text{len}(q)$  bit output of RBG where  $1 = x = q-1$
- $\text{len}(q) + 64$  bit output of RBG, followed by a mod  $q-1$  operation where  $1 = x = q-1$

The security strength of the RBG must be at least that of the security offered by the FFC parameter set. To test the cryptographic and field prime generation method for the provable primes method and/or the group generator  $g$  for a verifiable process, the evaluator must seed the TSF parameter generation routine with sufficient data to deterministically generate the parameter set. For each key length supported, the evaluator will have the TSF generate 25 parameter sets and key pairs. The evaluator will verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation by comparing values generated by the TSF with those generated from a known good implementation. Verification must also confirm:

- $g \neq 0, 1$
- $q$  divides  $p-1$
- $g^q \bmod p = 1$
- $g^x \bmod p = y$

for each FFC parameter set and key pair.

#### ***Diffie-Hellman Group 14 and FFC Schemes using "safe-prime" groups***

Testing for FFC Schemes using Diffie-Hellman group 14 and/or "safe-prime" groups is done as part of testing in FCS\_CKM.2.1

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Testing is satisfied through the Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP). The cryptographic implementation used by the TOE received CAVP Cert # A1400.

Key Generation for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) test is N/A. The TOE does not select ECC Schemes.

## **2.1.2 FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (Refined)**

### **2.1.2.1 TSS Assurance Activity**

The evaluator will ensure that the supported key establishment schemes correspond to the key generation schemes identified in FCS\_CKM.1.1. If the ST specifies more than one scheme, the evaluator will examine the TSS to verify that it identifies the usage for each scheme.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Table 18 in Section 7 of the [ST] identifies the supported key establishment schemes. The schemes identified (RSA, FFC) correspond with the key generation schemes identified in FCS\_CKM.1.1.

### **2.1.2.2 Guidance Documentation Assurance Activity**

The evaluator will verify that the AGD guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the OS to use the selected key establishment scheme(s).



## Evaluator Assessment:

Section 5 and Section 6 of the [AGD] provides guidance on how to configure the TOE to use the selected key establishment schemes.

### 2.1.2.3 Test Assurance Activity

Evaluation Activity Note: The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

#### Key Establishment Schemes

The evaluator will verify the implementation of the key establishment schemes supported by the OS using the applicable tests below.

#### RSAES-PKCS1-v1\_5 Key Establishment Schemes

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of RSAES-PKCS1-v1\_5 by using a known good implementation for each protocol selected in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 that uses RSAES-PKCS1-v1\_5.

#### Diffie-Hellman Group 14

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of Diffie-Hellman group 14 by using a known good implementation for each protocol selected in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 that uses Diffie-Hellman Group 14.

#### FFC Schemes using "safe-prime" groups (identified in Appendix D of SP 800-56A Revision 3)

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of "safe-prime" groups by using a known good implementation for each protocol selected in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 that uses "safe-prime" groups. This test must be performed for each "safe-prime" group that each protocol uses.

#### Function Test

The Function test verifies the ability of the OS to implement the key agreement schemes correctly. To conduct this test the evaluator will generate or obtain test vectors from a known good implementation of the OS's supported schemes. For each supported key agreement scheme-key agreement role combination, KDF type, and, if supported, key confirmation role- key confirmation type combination, the tester shall generate 10 sets of test vectors. The data set consists of the NIST approved curve (ECC) per 10 sets of public keys. These keys are static, ephemeral or both depending on the scheme being tested.

The evaluator will obtain the DKM, the corresponding OS's public keys (static and/or ephemeral), the MAC tag(s), and any inputs used in the KDF, such as the Other Information field OI and OS id fields.

If the OS does not use a KDF defined in SP 800-56A, the evaluator will obtain only the public keys and the hashed value of the shared secret.

The evaluator will verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of a given scheme by using a known good implementation to calculate the shared secret value, derive the keying material DKM, and compare hashes or MAC tags generated from these values.

If key confirmation is supported, the OS shall perform the above for each implemented approved MAC algorithm.

#### Validity Test



The Validity test verifies the ability of the OS to recognize another party's valid and invalid key agreement results with or without key confirmation. To conduct this test, the evaluator will obtain a list of the supporting cryptographic functions included in the SP800-56A key agreement implementation to determine which errors the OS should be able to recognize. The evaluator generates a set of 30 test vectors consisting of data sets including domain parameter values or NIST approved curves, the evaluator's public keys, the OS's public/private key pairs, MAC tag, and any inputs used in the KDF, such as the other info and OS id fields.

The evaluator will inject an error in some of the test vectors to test that the OS recognizes invalid key agreement results caused by the following fields being incorrect: the shared secret value Z, the DKM, the other information field OI, the data to be MAC'd, or the generated MAC tag. If the OS contains the full or partial (only ECC) public key validation, the evaluator will also individually inject errors in both parties' static public keys, both parties' ephemeral public keys and the OS's static private key to assure the OS detects errors in the public key validation function and/or the partial key validation function (in ECC only). At least two of the test vectors shall remain unmodified and therefore should result in valid key agreement results (they should pass).

The OS shall use these modified test vectors to emulate the key agreement scheme using the corresponding parameters. The evaluator will compare the OS's results with the results using a known good implementation verifying that the OS detects these errors.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Testing is satisfied through the Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP). The cryptographic implementation used by the TOE received CAVP Cert # A1400.

### **2.1.3 FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction**

#### **2.1.3.1 TSS Assurance Activity**

The evaluator examines the TSS to ensure it describes how the keys are managed in volatile memory. This description includes details of how each identified key is introduced into volatile memory (e.g. by derivation from user input, or by unwrapping a wrapped key stored in non-volatile memory) and how they are overwritten.

The evaluator will check to ensure the TSS lists each type of key that is stored in in non-volatile memory, and identifies how the TOE interacts with the underlying platform to manage keys (e.g., store, retrieve, destroy). The description includes details on the method of how the TOE interacts with the platform, including an identification and description of the interfaces it uses to manage keys (e.g., file system APIs, platform key store APIs).

If the ST makes use of the open assignment and fills in the type of pattern that is used, the evaluator examines the TSS to ensure it describes how that pattern is obtained and used. The evaluator will verify that the pattern does not contain any CSPs.

The evaluator will check that the TSS identifies any configurations or circumstances that may not strictly conform to the key destruction requirement.

If the selection "destruction of all key encrypting keys protecting target key according to FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4.1, where none of the KEKs protecting the target key are derived" is included the evaluator shall examine the TOE's keychain in the TSS and identify each instance when a key is destroyed by this method. In each instance the evaluator shall verify all keys capable of decrypting the target key are destroyed in accordance with a specified key destruction method in FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4.1 The evaluator **shall** verify that all of the keys capable of decrypting the target key are not able to be derived to re-establish the keychain after their destruction.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Table 18 in Section 7 of the [ST] identifies the following:

Asymmetric key material is stored in non-volatile memory. The /etc/ssh directory contains the host keys which are generated using ssh-keygen. The \$HOME/.ssh contains user keys and are generated using ssh-keygen Authorized public keys are generated remotely and input into the OS. TLS keys are stored in /etc/pki and can be generated from the OS or imported into the OS.



The OpenSSL library clears all RAM buffers holding sensitive data or keys by overwriting the memory with zeroes before releasing it.

### 2.1.3.2 Guidance Documentation Assurance Activity

There are a variety of concerns that may prevent or delay key destruction in some cases. The evaluator will check that the guidance documentation identifies configurations or circumstances that may not strictly conform to the key destruction requirement, and that this description is consistent with the relevant parts of the TSS and any other relevant Required Supplementary Information. The evaluator will check that the guidance documentation provides guidance on situations where key destruction may be delayed at the physical layer and how such situations can be avoided or mitigated if possible.

Some examples of what is expected to be in the documentation are provided here.

When the TOE does not have full access to the physical memory, it is possible that the storage may be implementing wear-leveling and garbage collection. This may create additional copies of the key that are logically inaccessible but persist physically. In this case, to mitigate this the drive should support the TRIM command and implements garbage collection to destroy these persistent copies when not actively engaged in other tasks.

Drive vendors implement garbage collection in a variety of different ways, as such there is a variable amount of time until data is truly removed from these solutions. There is a risk that data may persist for a longer amount of time if it is contained in a block with other data not ready for erasure. To reduce this risk, the operating system and file system of the OE should support TRIM, instructing the non-volatile memory to erase copies via garbage collection upon their deletion. If a RAID array is being used, only set-ups that support TRIM are utilized. If the drive is connected via PCI-Express, the operating system supports TRIM over that channel.

The drive should be healthy and contains minimal corrupted data and should be end-of-lifed before a significant amount of damage to drive health occurs, this minimizes the risk that small amounts of potentially recoverable data may remain in damaged areas of the drive.

#### Evaluator Assessment:

Section 7 of the [AGD] describes circumstances where SSDs levelling mechanism may prevent software from overwriting the exact physical location of the keys. Mitigation of this issue is also described in this section.

### 2.1.3.3 Test Assurance Activity

Test 1: Applied to each key held as in volatile memory and subject to destruction by overwrite by the TOE (whether or not the value is subsequently encrypted for storage in volatile or non-volatile memory). In the case where the only selection made for the destruction method key was removal of power, then this test is unnecessary. The evaluator will:

1. Record the value of the key in the TOE subject to clearing
2. Cause the TOE to perform a normal cryptographic processing with the key from Step #1
3. Cause the TOE to clear the key.
4. Cause the TOE to stop the execution but not exit.
5. Cause the TOE to dump the entire memory of the TOE into a binary file.
6. Search the content of the binary file created in Step #5 for instances of the known key value from Step #1.

Steps 1-6 ensure that the complete key does not exist anywhere in volatile memory. If a copy is found, then the test fails.

#### Evaluator Assessment:

Test 1: The evaluator used a debugger to set breakpoints where keys are generated and destroyed. Memory dumps were performed, and keys were verified to be zeroized after the process was complete.

Test 2: Applied to each key held in non-volatile memory and subject to destruction by the TOE. The evaluator will use special tools



(as needed), provided by the TOE developer if necessary, to ensure the tests function as intended.

1. Identify the purpose of the key and what access should fail when it is deleted. (e.g. the data encryption key being deleted will cause data decryption to fail.)
2. Cause the TOE to clear the key.
3. Have the TOE attempt the functionality that the cleared key would be necessary for.

The test succeeds if step 3 fails.

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#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 2: The TOE is no longer able to use the keys after being cleared in non-volatile memory.

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***Tests 3 and 4 do not apply for the selection instructing the underlying platform to destroy the representation of the key, as the TOE has no visibility into the inner workings and completely relies on the underlying platform.***

Test 3: The following tests are used to determine the TOE is able to request the platform to overwrite the key with a TOE supplied pattern.

Applied to each key held in non-volatile memory and subject to destruction by overwrite by the TOE. The evaluator will use a tool that provides a logical view of the media (e.g., MBR file system):

- Record the value of the key in the TOE subject to clearing.
- Cause the TOE to perform a normal cryptographic processing with the key from Step #1.
- Cause the TOE to clear the key.
- Search the logical view that the key was stored in for instances of the known key value from Step #1.

If a copy is found, then the test fails.

---

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

N/A.

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Test 4: Applied to each key held as non-volatile memory and subject to destruction by overwrite by the TOE. The evaluator will use a tool that provides a logical view of the media:

- Record the logical storage location of the key in the TOE subject to clearing.
- Cause the TOE to perform a normal cryptographic processing with the key from Step #1.
- Cause the TOE to clear the key.
- Read the logical storage location in Step #1 of non-volatile memory to ensure the appropriate pattern is utilized.

The test succeeds if correct pattern is used to overwrite the key in the memory location. If the pattern is not found the test fails.

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#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

N/A.



## 2.1.4 FCS\_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption (Refined)

### 2.1.4.1 Guidance Documentation Assurance Activity

The evaluator will verify that the AGD documents contains instructions required to configure the OS to use the required modes and key sizes.

#### Evaluator Assessment:

The evaluator examined the [AGD] document, specifically Section 6 - Configuring TLS and found that no key configuration was necessary.

### 2.1.4.2 Test Assurance Activity

#### AES-CBC Known Answer Tests

There are four Known Answer Tests (KATs), described below. In all KATs, the plaintext, ciphertext, and IV values shall be 128-bit blocks. The results from each test may either be obtained by the evaluator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator will compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.

KAT-1. To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will supply a set of 10 plaintext values and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES-CBC encryption of the given plaintext using a key value of all zeros and an IV of all zeros. Five plaintext values shall be encrypted with a 128-bit all-zeros key, and the other five shall be encrypted with a 256-bit all-zeros key. To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will perform the same test as for encrypt, using 10 ciphertext values as input and AES-CBC decryption.

KAT-2. To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will supply a set of 10 key values and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES-CBC encryption of an all-zeros plaintext using the given key value and an IV of all zeros. Five of the keys shall be 128-bit keys, and the other five shall be 256-bit keys. To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will perform the same test as for encrypt, using an all-zero ciphertext value as input and AES-CBC decryption.

KAT-3. To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will supply the two sets of key values described below and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES encryption of an all-zeros plaintext using the given key value and an IV of all zeros. The first set of keys shall have 128 128-bit keys, and the second set shall have 256 256-bit keys. Key  $i$  in each set shall have the leftmost  $i$  bits be ones and the rightmost  $N-i$  bits be zeros, for  $i$  in  $[1, N]$ . To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will supply the two sets of key and ciphertext value pairs described below and obtain the plaintext value that results from AES-CBC decryption of the given ciphertext using the given key and an IV of all zeros. The first set of key/ciphertext pairs shall have 128 128-bit key/ciphertext pairs, and the second set of key/ciphertext pairs shall have 256 256-bit key/ciphertext pairs. Key  $i$  in each set shall have the leftmost  $i$  bits be ones and the rightmost  $N-i$  bits be zeros, for  $i$  in  $[1, N]$ . The ciphertext value in each pair shall be the value that results in an all-zeros plaintext when decrypted with its corresponding key.

KAT-4. To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will supply the set of 128 plaintext values described below and obtain the two ciphertext values that result from AES-CBC encryption of the given plaintext using a 128-bit key value of all zeros with an IV of all zeros and using a 256-bit key value of all zeros with an IV of all zeros, respectively. Plaintext value  $i$  in each set shall have the leftmost  $i$  bits be ones and the rightmost  $128-i$  bits be zeros, for  $i$  in  $[1, 128]$ .

To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will perform the same test as for encrypt, using ciphertext values of the same form as the plaintext in the encrypt test as input and AES-CBC decryption.

#### Evaluator Assessment:

Testing is satisfied through the Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP). The cryptographic implementation used by the TOE received CAVP Cert # A1400.

#### AES-CBC Multi-Block Message Test

The evaluator will test the encrypt functionality by encrypting an  $i$ -block message where  $1 < i = 10$ . The evaluator will choose a key,



an IV and plaintext message of length  $i$  blocks and encrypt the message, using the mode to be tested, with the chosen key and IV. The ciphertext shall be compared to the result of encrypting the same plaintext message with the same key and IV using a known good implementation. The evaluator will also test the decrypt functionality for each mode by decrypting an  $i$ -block message where  $1 < i \leq 10$ . The evaluator will choose a key, an IV and a ciphertext message of length  $i$  blocks and decrypt the message, using the mode to be tested, with the chosen key and IV. The plaintext shall be compared to the result of decrypting the same ciphertext message with the same key and IV using a known good implementation.

### Evaluator Assessment:

Testing is satisfied through the Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP). The cryptographic implementation used by the TOE received CAVP Cert # A1400.

### AES-CBC Monte Carlo Tests

The evaluator will test the encrypt functionality using a set of 200 plaintext, IV, and key 3- tuples. 100 of these shall use 128 bit keys, and 100 shall use 256 bit keys. The plaintext and IV values shall be 128-bit blocks. For each 3-tuple, 1000 iterations shall be run as follows:

```
# Input: PT, IV, Key
for i = 1 to 1000:
  if i == 1:
    CT[1] = AES-CBC-Encrypt(Key, IV, PT)
    PT = IV
  else:
    CT[i] = AES-CBC-Encrypt(Key, PT)
    PT = CT[i-1]
```

The ciphertext computed in the 1000th iteration (i.e., CT[1000]) is the result for that trial. This result shall be compared to the result of running 1000 iterations with the same values using a known good implementation.

The evaluator will test the decrypt functionality using the same test as for encrypt, exchanging CT and PT and replacing AES-CBC-Encrypt with AES-CBC-Decrypt.

### Evaluator Assessment:

Testing is satisfied through the Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP). The cryptographic implementation used by the TOE received CAVP Cert # A1400.

### AES-GCM Monte Carlo Tests

The evaluator will test the authenticated encrypt functionality of AES-GCM for each combination of the following input parameter lengths:

128 bit and 256 bit keys

Two plaintext lengths. One of the plaintext lengths shall be a non-zero integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported. The other plaintext length shall not be an integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported.

Three AAD lengths. One AAD length shall be 0, if supported. One AAD length shall be a non-zero integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported. One AAD length shall not be an integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported.

Two IV lengths. If 96 bit IV is supported, 96 bits shall be one of the two IV lengths tested.

The evaluator will test the encrypt functionality using a set of 10 key, plaintext, AAD, and IV tuples for each combination of



parameter lengths above and obtain the ciphertext value and tag that results from AES-GCM authenticated encrypt. Each supported tag length shall be tested at least once per set of 10. The IV value may be supplied by the evaluator or the implementation being tested, as long as it is known.

The evaluator will test the decrypt functionality using a set of 10 key, ciphertext, tag, AAD, and IV 5-tuples for each combination of parameter lengths above and obtain a Pass/Fail result on authentication and the decrypted plaintext if Pass. The set shall include five tuples that Pass and five that Fail.

The results from each test may either be obtained by the evaluator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator will compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.

### Evaluator Assessment:

Testing is satisfied through the Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP). The cryptographic implementation used by the TOE received CAVP Cert # A1400.

### AES-CCM Tests

The evaluator will test the generation-encryption and decryption-verification functionality of AES-CCM for the following input parameter and tag lengths:

128 bit and 256 bit keys

Two payload lengths. One payload length shall be the shortest supported payload length, greater than or equal to zero bytes. The other payload length shall be the longest supported payload length, less than or equal to 32 bytes (256 bits).

Two or three associated data lengths. One associated data length shall be 0, if supported. One associated data length shall be the shortest supported payload length, greater than or equal to zero bytes. One associated data length shall be the longest supported payload length, less than or equal to 32 bytes (256 bits). If the implementation supports an associated data length of 216 bytes, an associated data length of 216 bytes shall be tested.

Nonce lengths. All supported nonce lengths between 7 and 13 bytes, inclusive, shall be tested.

Tag lengths. All supported tag lengths of 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 and 16 bytes shall be tested.

To test the generation-encryption functionality of AES-CCM, the evaluator will perform the following four tests:

Test 1: For EACH supported key and associated data length and ANY supported payload, nonce and tag length, the evaluator will supply one key value, one nonce value and 10 pairs of associated data and payload values and obtain the resulting ciphertext.

Test 2: For EACH supported key and payload length and ANY supported associated data, nonce and tag length, the evaluator will supply one key value, one nonce value and 10 pairs of associated data and payload values and obtain the resulting ciphertext.

Test 3: For EACH supported key and nonce length and ANY supported associated data, payload and tag length, the evaluator will supply one key value and 10 associated data, payload and nonce value 3-tuples and obtain the resulting ciphertext.

Test 4: For EACH supported key and tag length and ANY supported associated data, payload and nonce length, the evaluator will supply one key value, one nonce value and 10 pairs of associated data and payload values and obtain the resulting ciphertext.

To determine correctness in each of the above tests, the evaluator will compare the ciphertext with the result of generation-encryption of the same inputs with a known good implementation.

To test the decryption-verification functionality of AES-CCM, for EACH combination of supported associated data length, payload length, nonce length and tag length, the evaluator **shall** supply a key value and 15 nonce, associated data and ciphertext 3-tuples and obtain either a FAIL result or a PASS result with the decrypted payload. The evaluator will supply 10 tuples that should FAIL and 5 that should PASS per set of 15.

Additionally, the evaluator **will** use tests from the IEEE 802.11-02/362r6 document "Proposed Test vectors for IEEE 802.11 TGi", dated September 10, 2002, Section 2.1 AESCCMP Encapsulation Example and Section 2.2 Additional AES CCMP Test Vectors to





further verify the IEEE 802.11-2007 implementation of AES-CCMP.

### Evaluator Assessment:

N/A. The TOE does not claim AES-CCM

### AES-GCM Test

The evaluator will test the authenticated encrypt functionality of AES-GCM for each combination of the following input parameter lengths:

128 bit and 256 bit keys

Two plaintext lengths. One of the plaintext lengths shall be a non-zero integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported. The other plaintext length shall not be an integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported.

Three AAD lengths. One AAD length shall be 0, if supported. One AAD length shall be a non-zero integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported. One AAD length shall not be an integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported.

Two IV lengths. If 96 bit IV is supported, 96 bits shall be one of the two IV lengths tested.

The evaluator will test the encrypt functionality using a set of 10 key, plaintext, AAD, and IV tuples for each combination of parameter lengths above and obtain the ciphertext value and tag that results from AES-GCM authenticated encrypt. Each supported tag length shall be tested at least once per set of 10. The IV value may be supplied by the evaluator or the implementation being tested, as long as it is known.

The evaluator will test the decrypt functionality using a set of 10 key, ciphertext, tag, AAD, and IV 5-tuples for each combination of parameter lengths above and obtain a Pass/Fail result on authentication and the decrypted plaintext if Pass. The set shall include five tuples that Pass and five that Fail.

The results from each test may either be obtained by the evaluator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator will compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.

### Evaluator Assessment:

Testing is satisfied through the Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP). The cryptographic implementation used by the TOE received CAVP Cert # A1400.

### XTS-AES Test

The evaluator will test the encrypt functionality of XTS-AES for each combination of the following input parameter lengths:

256 bit (for AES-128) and 512 bit (for AES-256) keys

Three data unit (i.e., plaintext) lengths. One of the data unit lengths shall be a nonzero integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported. One of the data unit lengths shall be an integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported. The third data unit length shall be either the longest supported data unit length or 216 bits, whichever is smaller.

using a set of 100 (key, plaintext and 128-bit random tweak value) 3-tuples and obtain the ciphertext that results from XTS-AES encrypt.

The evaluator may supply a data unit sequence number instead of the tweak value if the implementation supports it. The data unit sequence number is a base-10 number ranging between 0 and 255 that implementations convert to a tweak value internally.

The evaluator will test the decrypt functionality of XTS-AES using the same test as for encrypt, replacing plaintext values with ciphertext values and XTS-AES encrypt with XTS-AES decrypt.



## Evaluator Assessment:

Testing is satisfied through the Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP). The cryptographic implementation used by the TOE received CAVP Cert # A1400

### AES Key Wrap (AES-KW) and Key Wrap with Padding (AES-KWP) Test

The evaluator *will* test the authenticated encryption functionality of AES-KW for EACH combination of the following input parameter lengths:

128 and 256 bit key encryption keys (KEKs)

Three plaintext lengths. One of the plaintext lengths shall be two semi-blocks (128 bits). One of the plaintext lengths shall be three semi-blocks (192 bits). The third data unit length shall be the longest supported plaintext length less than or equal to 64 semi-blocks (4096 bits).

using a set of 100 key and plaintext pairs and obtain the ciphertext that results from AES-KW authenticated encryption. To determine correctness, the evaluator will use the AES-KW authenticated-encryption function of a known good implementation.

The evaluator will test the authenticated-decryption functionality of AES-KW using the same test as for authenticated-encryption, replacing plaintext values with ciphertext values and AES-KW authenticated-encryption with AES-KW authenticated-decryption.

The evaluator will test the authenticated-encryption functionality of AES-KWP using the same test as for AES-KW authenticated-encryption with the following change in the three plaintext lengths:

One plaintext length shall be one octet. One plaintext length shall be 20 octets (160 bits).

One plaintext length shall be the longest supported plaintext length less than or equal to 512 octets (4096 bits).

The evaluator will test the authenticated-decryption functionality of AES-KWP using the same test as for AES-KWP authenticated-encryption, replacing plaintext values with ciphertext values and AES-KWP authenticated-encryption with AES-KWP authenticated-decryption.

## Evaluator Assessment:

N/A. The TOE does not claim AES-KW or AES-KWP.

## 2.1.5 FCS\_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation – Hashing (Refined)

### 2.1.5.1 TSS Assurance Activity

The evaluator will check that the association of the hash function with other application cryptographic functions (for example, the digital signature verification function) is documented in the TSS.

## Evaluator Assessment:

Table 18 in Section 7 of the [ST] states that the TOE supports Cryptographic hashing services conforming to FIPS Pub 180-4. The hashing algorithms are used for signature services and HMAC services.

The following hashing algorithms supported: SHA1, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512.

The message digest sizes supported are: 160bits, 256 bits, 384 bits and 512 bits.



### 2.1.5.2 Test Assurance Activity

The TSF hashing functions can be implemented in one of two modes. The first mode is the byte-oriented mode. In this mode the TSF only hashes messages that are an integral number of bytes in length; i.e., the length (in bits) of the message to be hashed is divisible by 8. The second mode is the bit-oriented mode. In this mode the TSF hashes messages of arbitrary length. As there are different tests for each mode, an indication is given in the following sections for the bit-oriented vs. the byte-oriented test macs. The evaluator will perform all of the following tests for each hash algorithm implemented by the TSF and used to satisfy the requirements of this PP.

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test application that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found in the production application.

**Test 1: Short Messages Test (Bit oriented Mode)** - The evaluator will generate an input set consisting of  $m+1$  messages, where  $m$  is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the messages range sequentially from 0 to  $m$  bits. The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluator will compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Testing is satisfied through the Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP). The cryptographic implementation used by the TOE received CAVP Certs # A1400, A1401, and A1402.

**Test 2: Short Messages Test (Byte oriented Mode)** - The evaluator will generate an input set consisting of  $m/8+1$  messages, where  $m$  is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the messages range sequentially from 0 to  $m/8$  bytes, with each message being an integral number of bytes. The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluator will compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Testing is satisfied through the Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP). The cryptographic implementation used by the TOE received CAVP Certs # A1400, A1401, and A1402.

**Test 3: Selected Long Messages Test (Bit oriented Mode)** – The evaluator will generate an input set consisting of  $m$  messages, where  $m$  is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the  $i$ th message is  $512 + 99 \cdot i$ , where  $1 \leq i \leq m$ . The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluator will compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Testing is satisfied through the Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP). The cryptographic implementation used by the TOE received CAVP Certs # A1400, A1401, and A1402.

**Test 4: Selected Long Messages Test (Byte oriented Mode)** – The evaluator will generate an input set consisting of  $m/8$  messages, where  $m$  is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the  $i$ th message is  $512 + 8 \cdot 99 \cdot i$ , where  $1 \leq i \leq m/8$ . The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluator will compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Testing is satisfied through the Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP). The cryptographic implementation used by



the TOE received CAVP Certs # A1400, A1401, and A1402.

Test 5: Pseudorandomly Generated Messages Test - This test is for byte-oriented implementations only. The evaluator will randomly generate a seed that is  $n$  bits long, where  $n$  is the length of the message digest produced by the hash function to be tested. The evaluator will then formulate a set of 100 messages and associated digests by following the algorithm provided in Figure 1 of [SHAVS]. The evaluator will then ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Testing is satisfied through the Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP). The cryptographic implementation used by the TOE received CAVP Certs # A1400, A1401, and A1402.

## **2.1.6 FCS\_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation – Signing (Refined)**

### **2.1.6.1 Test Assurance Activity**

The evaluator will perform the following activities based on the selections in the ST.

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test application that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found in the production application.

#### **ECDSA Algorithm Tests**

Test 1: ECDSA FIPS 186-4 Signature Generation Test. For each supported NIST curve (i.e., P-256, P-384 and P-521) and SHA function pair, the evaluator will generate 10 1024-bit long messages and obtain for each message a public key and the resulting signature values  $R$  and  $S$ . To determine correctness, the evaluator *will* use the signature verification function of a known good implementation.

Test 2: ECDSA FIPS 186-4 Signature Verification Test. For each supported NIST curve (i.e., P-256, P-384 and P-521) and SHA function pair, the evaluator will generate a set of 10 1024-bit message, public key and signature tuples and modify one of the values (message, public key or signature) in five of the 10 tuples. The evaluator will verify that 5 responses indicate success and 5 responses indicate failure.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

N/A. The TOE does not claim ECDSA.

#### **RSA Signature Algorithm Tests**

Test 1: Signature Generation Test. The evaluator will verify the implementation of RSA Signature Generation by the OS using the Signature Generation Test. To conduct this test the evaluator must generate or obtain 10 messages from a trusted reference implementation for each modulus size/SHA combination supported by the TSF. The evaluator will have the OS use its private key and modulus value to sign these messages. The evaluator will verify the correctness of the TSF's signature using a known good implementation and the associated public keys to verify the signatures.

Test 2: Signature Verification Test. The evaluator will perform the Signature Verification test to verify the ability of the OS to recognize another party's valid and invalid signatures. The evaluator will inject errors into the test vectors produced during the Signature Verification Test by introducing errors in some of the public keys,  $e$ , messages, IR format, and/or signatures. The evaluator will verify that the OS returns failure when validating each signature.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**



Testing is satisfied through the Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP). The cryptographic implementation used by the TOE received CAVP Cert # A1400.

## 2.1.7 FCS\_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication (Refined)

### 2.1.7.1 Test Assurance Activity

The evaluator will perform the following activities based on the selections in the ST:

For each of the supported parameter sets, the evaluator shall compose 15 sets of test data. Each set shall consist of a key and message data. The evaluator will have the OS generate HMAC tags for these sets of test data. The resulting MAC tags shall be compared against the result of generating HMAC tags with the same key and IV using a known-good implementation.

#### Evaluator Assessment:

Testing is satisfied through the Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP). The cryptographic implementation used by the TOE received CAVP Certs # A1400, A1401, and A1402.

## 2.1.8 FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

### 2.1.8.1 Test Assurance Activity

#### FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1

The evaluator will perform the following tests: The evaluator will perform 15 trials for the RNG implementation. If the RNG is configurable, the evaluator will perform 15 trials for each configuration. The evaluator will also confirm that the operational guidance contains appropriate instructions for configuring the RNG functionality.

If the RNG has prediction resistance enabled, each trial consists of (1) instantiate DRBG, (2) generate the first block of random bits (3) generate a second block of random bits (4) uninstantiate. The evaluator verifies that the second block of random bits is the expected value. The evaluator will generate eight input values for each trial. The first is a count (0 – 14). The next three are entropy input, nonce, and personalization string for the instantiate operation. The next two are additional input and entropy input for the first call to generate. The final two are additional input and entropy input for the second call to generate. These values are randomly generated. "generate one block of random bits" means to generate random bits with number of returned bits equal to the Output Block Length (as defined in NIST SP 800-90A).

If the RNG does not have prediction resistance, each trial consists of (1) instantiate DRBG, (2) generate the first block of random bits (3) reseed, (4) generate a second block of random bits (5) uninstantiate. The evaluator verifies that the second block of random bits is the expected value. The evaluator will generate eight input values for each trial. The first is a count (0 – 14). The next three are entropy input, nonce, and personalization string for the instantiate operation. The fifth value is additional input to the first call to generate. The sixth and seventh are additional input and entropy input to the call to reseed. The final value is additional input to the second generate call.

The following list contains more information on some of the input values to be generated/selected by the evaluator.

Entropy input: The length of the entropy input value must equal the seed length.

Nonce: If a nonce is supported (CTR\_DRBG with no Derivation Function does not use a nonce), the nonce bit length is one-half the seed length.

Personalization string: The length of the personalization string must be less than or equal to seed length. If the implementation only supports one personalization string length, then the same length can be used for both values. If more than one string length is support, the evaluator will use personalization strings of two different lengths. If the implementation does not use a personalization string, no value needs to be supplied.



Additional input: The additional input bit lengths have the same defaults and restrictions as the personalization string lengths.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Testing is satisfied through the Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP). The cryptographic implementation used by the TOE received CAVP Certs # A1400, A1401, and A1402.

#### **2.1.8.2 Entropy Assessment Activity**

##### **FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2**

Documentation shall be produced - and the evaluator will perform the activities - in accordance with Appendix E of the OS PP and the Clarification to the Entropy Documentation and Assessment Annex.

In the future, specific statistical testing (in line with NIST SP 800-90B) will be required to verify the entropy estimates.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

The evaluation evidence required by this assessment activity can be found in the [ENTROPY] document.

#### **2.1.9 FCS\_STO\_EXT.1 Storage of Sensitive Data**

##### **2.1.9.1 TSS Assurance Activity**

The evaluator will check the TSS to ensure that it lists all persistent sensitive data for which the OS provides a storage capability. For each of these items, the evaluator will confirm that the TSS lists for what purpose it can be used, and how it is stored. The evaluator will confirm that cryptographic operations used to protect the data occur as specified in FCS\_COP.1(1).

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Table 18 in Section 7 - TOE Summary Specification of [ST] states that the TOE supports block device encryption where zero or more disk partitions can be encrypted as a whole. It is at the system administrator's discretion as to which partitions will be encrypted. In order to protect the bootable partition, a password mechanism can be enabled in the BIOS (or GRUB).

##### **2.1.9.2 Guidance Documentation Assurance Activity**

The evaluator will also consult the developer documentation to verify that an interface exists for applications to securely store credentials.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Section 15 in the [AGD] provides information on the secure storage of application credentials.

#### **2.1.10 FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol**

##### **2.1.10.1 TSS Assurance Activity**

##### **FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.1**

The evaluator will check the description of the implementation of this protocol in the TSS to ensure that the cipher suites supported are specified. The evaluator will check the TSS to ensure that the cipher suites specified include those listed for this component.

##### **FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.2**



The evaluator will ensure that the TSS describes the client's method of establishing all reference identifiers from the application-configured reference identifier, including which types of reference identifiers are supported (e.g. Common Name, DNS Name, URI Name, Service Name, or other application-specific Subject Alternative Names) and whether IP addresses and wildcards are supported. The evaluator will ensure that this description identifies whether and the manner in which certificate pinning is supported or used by the OS.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.1

The evaluator confirmed that the TSS lists the cipher suites supported by the OS in Table 18 of Section 7 of the [ST]. The cipher suites specified are identical to those listed for this component.

FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.2

Table 18 of Section 7 of the [ST] states that the OS verifies that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier according to RFC 6125. The reference identifiers supported are DNS and IP addresses. The TOE does not support certificate pinning.

**2.1.10.2 Guidance Documentation Assurance Activity**

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FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.1

The evaluator will also check the operational guidance to ensure that it contains instructions on configuring the OS so that TLS conforms to the description in the TSS.

FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.2

The evaluator will verify that the AGD guidance includes instructions for setting the reference identifier to be used for the purposes of certificate validation in TLS.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.1

Section 6 in the [AGD] provides instructions on configuring the OS such that TLS conforms to the description in the TSS.

FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.2

Section 22 in the [AGD] provides instructions for setting the reference identifier.

**2.1.10.3 Test Assurance Activity**

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FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.1

The evaluator will also perform the following tests:

Test 1: The evaluator will establish a TLS connection using each of the cipher suites specified by the requirement. This connection may be established as part of the establishment of a higher-level protocol, e.g., as part of an EAP session. It is sufficient to observe the successful negotiation of a cipher suite to satisfy the intent of the test; it is not necessary to examine the characteristics of the encrypted traffic in an attempt to discern the cipher suite being used (for example, that the cryptographic algorithm is 128-bit AES and not 256-bit AES).

Test 2: The evaluator will attempt to establish the connection using a server with a server certificate that contains the Server Authentication purpose in the extendedKeyUsage field and verify that a connection is established. The evaluator will then verify that the client rejects an otherwise valid server certificate that lacks the Server Authentication purpose in the extendedKeyUsage field and a connection is not established. Ideally, the two certificates should be identical except for the extendedKeyUsage field.

Test 3: The evaluator will send a server certificate in the TLS connection that does not match the server-selected cipher suite (for example, send a ECDSA certificate while using the TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA cipher suite or send a RSA certificate while



using one of the ECDSA cipher suites.) The evaluator will verify that the OS disconnects after receiving the server's Certificate handshake message.

Test 4: The evaluator will configure the server to select the TLS\_NULL\_WITH\_NULL\_NULL cipher suite and verify that the client denies the connection.

Test 5: The evaluator will perform the following modifications to the traffic:

Test 5.1: Change the TLS version selected by the server in the Server Hello to a non-supported TLS version (for example 1.3 represented by the two bytes 03 04) and verify that the client rejects the connection.

Test 5.2: Modify at least one byte in the server's nonce in the Server Hello handshake message, and verify that the client rejects the Server Key Exchange handshake message (if using a DHE or ECDHE cipher suite) or that the server denies the client's Finished handshake message.

Test 5.3: Modify the server's selected cipher suite in the Server Hello handshake message to be a cipher suite not presented in the Client Hello handshake message. The evaluator **will** verify that the client rejects the connection after receiving the Server Hello.

Test 5.4: If an ECDHE or DHE ciphersuite is selected, modify the signature block in the Server's Key Exchange handshake message, and verify that the client rejects the connection after receiving the Server Key Exchange message.

Test 5.5: Modify a byte in the Server Finished handshake message, and verify that the client sends a fatal alert upon receipt and does not send any application data.

Test 5.6: Send a garbled message from the Server after the Server has issued the Change Cipher Spec message and verify that the client denies the connection.

### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: The evaluator initiated a connection to a remote TLS server and verified that the connection succeeds for each claimed cipher suite.

Test 2: The evaluator initiated a connection to a remote TLS server using a certificate with the Server Authentication purpose in the EKU field and verified the connection succeeds. An attempt to connect to the same TLS server using a certificate with a Client Authentication purpose in the EKU field failed.

Test 3: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote TLS server using a certificate that did not match the selected cipher suite and verified the connection fails.

Test 4: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote TLS server using the TLS\_NULL\_WITH\_NULL\_NULL cipher suite and verified the connection fails.

Test 5.1: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote TLS server using a non-supported TLS version and verified the connection fails.

Test 5.2: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote TLS server that modified the server nonce in the server hello message and verified the connection fails.

Test 5.3: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote TLS server that modifies the cipher suite to a non-supported one and verified the connection fails.

Test 5.4: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote TLS server that modifies the signature block on the server key exchange message and verified the connection fails.

Test 5.5: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote TLS server that modifies the server finished message and verified the connection fails.

Test 5.6: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote TLS server that sends a garbled message after the change cipher spec message and verified the connection fails

---

### **FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.2**

The evaluator will configure the reference identifier according to the AGD guidance and perform the following tests during a TLS





connection:

Test 1: The evaluator will present a server certificate that does not contain an identifier in either the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) or Common Name (CN) that matches the reference identifier. The evaluator will verify that the connection fails.

Test 2: The evaluator will present a server certificate that contains a CN that matches the reference identifier, contains the SAN extension, but does not contain an identifier in the SAN that matches the reference identifier. The evaluator shall verify that the connection fails. The evaluator will repeat this test for each supported SAN type.

Test 3: [conditional] If the TOE does not mandate the presence of the SAN extension, the evaluator will present a server certificate that contains a CN that matches the reference identifier and does not contain the SAN extension. The evaluator **will** verify that the connection succeeds. If the TOE mandates the presence of the SAN extension, this test shall be omitted.

Test 4: The evaluator will present a server certificate that contains a CN that does not match the reference identifier but does contain an identifier in the SAN that matches. The evaluator will verify that the connection succeeds.

Test 5: The evaluator will perform the following wildcard tests with each supported type of reference identifier:

Test 5.1: The evaluator will present a server certificate containing a wildcard that is not in the left-most label of the presented identifier (e.g. foo.\*.example.com) and verify that the connection fails.

Test 5.2: The evaluator will present a server certificate containing a wildcard in the left-most label but not preceding the public suffix (e.g. \*.example.com). The evaluator will configure the reference identifier with a single left-most label (e.g. foo.example.com) and verify that the connection succeeds. The evaluator will configure the reference identifier without a left-most label as in the certificate (e.g. example.com) and verify that the connection fails. The evaluator will configure the reference identifier with two left-most labels (e.g. bar.foo.example.com) and verify that the connection fails.

Test 5.3: The evaluator will present a server certificate containing a wildcard in the left-most label immediately preceding the public suffix (e.g. \*.com). The evaluator will configure the reference identifier with a single left-most label (e.g. foo.com) and verify that the connection fails. The evaluator will configure the reference identifier with two left-most labels (e.g. bar.foo.com) and verify that the connection fails.

Test 6: [conditional] If URI or Service name reference identifiers are supported, the evaluator will configure the DNS name and the service identifier. The evaluator will present a server certificate containing the correct DNS name and service identifier in the URIName or SRVName fields of the SAN and verify that the connection succeeds. The evaluator will repeat this test with the wrong service identifier (but correct DNS name) and verify that the connection fails.

Test 7: [conditional] If pinned certificates are supported the evaluator will present a certificate that does not match the pinned certificate and verify that the connection fails.

### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote TLS server using a certificate containing an invalid CN and invalid SAN and verified the connection fails.

Test 2: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote TLS server using a certificate with a valid CN and an invalid SAN and verified the connection fails.

Test 3: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote TLS server using a certificate with a valid CN and no SAN extension and verified the connection fails.

Test 4: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote TLS server using a certificate with an invalid CN and a valid SAN and verified the connection fails.

Test 5.1: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote TLS server using a certificate with a wildcard not in the left-most label and verified the connection fails.

Test 5.2: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote TLS server using a certificate with a wildcard in the left-most label with the reference identifier set to a single left-most label. The connection succeeds. The evaluator then configured the reference identifier without a left-most label and verified the connection fails. A final test with the reference identifier consisting of two left-most labels was verified to fail an attempted connection.

Test 5.3: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote TLS server using a certificate with a wildcard preceding the public suffix and the reference identifier set to a single left-most label and verified the connection fails. The reference identifier was then



configured with two left-most labels and the connection failed.

Test 6: N/A.

Test 7: N/A.

---

#### FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.3

The evaluator will use TLS as a function to verify that the validation rules in FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1 are adhered to and shall perform the following additional test:

Test 1: The evaluator will demonstrate that a peer using a certificate without a valid certification path results in an authenticate failure. Using the administrative guidance, the evaluator will then load the trusted CA certificate(s) needed to validate the peer's certificate, and demonstrate that the connection succeeds. The evaluator then shall delete one of the CA certificates, and show that the connection fails.

Test 2: The evaluator will demonstrate that a peer using a certificate which has been revoked results in an authentication failure.

Test 3: The evaluator will demonstrate that a peer using a certificate which has passed its expiration date results in an authentication failure.

Test 4: the evaluator will demonstrate that a peer using a certificate which does not have a valid identifier shall result in an authentication failure.

---

#### Evaluator Assessment

Test 1: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote TLS server using a certificate using an invalid certification path and verified that the connection failed. The same test was performed using a valid path and certificate chain and the connection was successful. The evaluator then removed one of the CA certificates required to validate the CA chain and verified that the connection failed.

Test 2: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote TLS server using a revoked certificate and verified that the connection failed.

Test 3: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote TLS server using a certificate that had expired and verified that the connection failed.

Test 4: This test is satisfied by FCS\_TLSC\_EXT1.2, Tests 1-5.3.

## 2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)

### 2.2.1 FDP\_ACF\_EXT.1 Access Controls for Protecting User Data

#### 2.2.1.1 TSS Assurance Activity

---

The evaluator will confirm that the TSS comprehensively describes the access control policy enforced by the OS. The description must include the rules by which accesses to particular files and directories are determined for particular users. The evaluator will inspect the TSS to ensure that it describes the access control rules in such detail that given any possible scenario between a user and a file governed by the OS the access control decision is unambiguous.

---

#### Evaluator Assessment:

Table 18 in Section 7 of the [ST] identifies the access control policy enforced by the OS. The TOE provides support for POSIX type ACLs. Users can configure ACLs that define access for users, groups, programs, processes, files and directories.

#### 2.2.1.2 Test Assurance Activity

---

The evaluator will create two new standard user accounts on the system and conduct the following tests:

---



Test 1: The evaluator will authenticate to the system as the first user and create a file within that user's home directory. The evaluator will then log off the system and log in as the second user. The evaluator will then attempt to read the file created in the first user's home directory. The evaluator will ensure that the read attempt is denied.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: The evaluator created a file while logged in as a specific user. After re-authenticating as a different user, that user could not read the file.

---

Test 2: The evaluator will authenticate to the system as the first user and create a file within that user's home directory. The evaluator will then log off the system and log in as the second user. The evaluator will then attempt to modify the file created in the first user's home directory. The evaluator will ensure that the modification attempt is denied.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 2: The evaluator attempted to modify the file created in Test 1 while logged in as the second user and verified that the user could not modify the file.

---

Test 3: The evaluator will authenticate to the system as the first user and create a file within that user's home directory. The evaluator will then log off the system and log in as the second user. The evaluator will then attempt to delete the file created in the first user's home directory. The evaluator will ensure that the deletion is denied.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 3: The evaluator attempted to delete the file created in Test 1 while logged in as the second user and verified the file could not be deleted.

---

Test 4: The evaluator will authenticate to the system as the first user. The evaluator will then attempt to create a file in the second user's home directory. The evaluator will ensure that the creation of the file is denied.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 4: The evaluator attempted to create a file in the home directory of a different user than the user that was currently logged in and verified that this action was denied.

---

Test 5: The evaluator will authenticate to the system as the first user and attempt to modify the file created in the first user's home directory. The evaluator will ensure that the modification of the file is accepted.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 5: The evaluator attempted to modify the file created in Test 1 while logged in as the user that created it and verified the action was successful.

---

Test 6: The evaluator will authenticate to the system as the first user and attempt to delete the file created in the first user's directory. The evaluator will ensure that the deletion of the file is accepted.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 6: The evaluator attempted to delete the file created in Test 1 while logged in as the user that created it and verified the action was successful.



## 2.3 Security Management (FMT)

### 2.3.1 FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1 Management of security functions behavior

#### 2.3.1.1 TSS Assurance Activity

The evaluator will verify that the TSS describes those management functions that are restricted to Administrators, including how the user is prevented from performing those functions, or not able to use any interfaces that allow access to that function.

##### Evaluator Assessment:

Table 18 in Section 7 of the [ST] identifies the restricted management functions (FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1 section) and how those functions are restricted by the operating system (FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1 section).

The following management functions are restricted to the administrator:

- Enable/disable session timeout
- Configure session inactivity timeout
- Configure local audit storage capacity
- Configure minimum password length
- Configure minimum number of special characters in password
- Configure minimum number of numeric characters in password
- Configure minimum number of uppercase characters in password
- Configure minimum number of lowercase characters in password
- Configure lockout policy for unsuccessful authentication attempts through limiting number of attempts during a time period
- Configure host-based firewall
- Configure audit rules
- Configure name/address of network time server
- Enable/disable automatic software update

#### 2.3.1.2 Test Assurance Activity

Test 1: For each function that is indicated as restricted to the administrator, the evaluation shall perform the function as an administrator, as specified in the Operational Guidance, and determine that it has the expected effect as outlined by the Operational Guidance and the SFR. The evaluator will then perform the function (or otherwise attempt to access the function) as a non-administrator and observe that they are unable to invoke that functionality.

##### Evaluator Assessment:

Test 1: The evaluator attempted to perform each of the functions both as an administrator and a non-administrator as specified in the Operational Guidance and the SFR. The evaluator verified that configuration of these functions is only available to administrators.

### 2.3.2 FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1 Specification of Management Functions

#### 2.3.2.1 Guidance Documentation Assurance Activity

The evaluator will verify that every management function captured in the ST is described in the operational guidance and that the description contains the information required to perform the management duties associated with the management function.

##### Evaluator Assessment:



The evaluator verified that the [AGD] document provides the information required to perform the management duties associated with management functions in the following sections:

Section 8 Configuring User Authentication

Section 10 Creating User Accounts

Section 12 System Firewall

Section 13 Network Time Service

Section 14 Session Timeout

Section 18 Applying Updates

Section 19 Auditing

### 2.3.2.2 Test Assurance Activity

*The evaluator will test the OS's ability to provide the management functions by configuring the operating system and testing each option selected from above. The evaluator is expected to test these functions in all the ways in which the ST and guidance documentation state the configuration can be managed.*

#### Evaluator Assessment:

This test is satisfied by FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1.

## 2.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

### 2.4.1 FPT\_ACF\_EXT.1 Access Controls

#### 2.4.1.1 TSS Assurance Activity

FPT\_ACF\_EXT.1.1

The evaluator will confirm that the TSS specifies the locations of kernel drivers/modules, security audit logs, shared libraries, system executables, and system configuration files. Every file does not need to be individually identified, but the system's conventions for storing and protecting such files must be specified.

#### Evaluator Assessment:

The TSS lists the following locations in Table 18 in Section 7 of the [ST] for each identified file type from the assurance activity

Kernel Drivers and Modules - /lib/modules

Security Audit Logs - /var/log/audit

Shared Libraries - /lib, /lib64, /usr/lib and /usr/lib64

System Executables - /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, and /usr/sbin

System Configuration Files - /etc

#### 2.4.1.2 Test Assurance Activity

FPT\_ACF\_EXT.1.1

The evaluator will create an unprivileged user account. Using this account, the evaluator will ensure that the following tests result in a negative outcome (i.e., the action results in the OS denying the evaluator permission to complete the action):



- Test 1: The evaluator will attempt to modify all kernel drivers and modules.
- Test 2: The evaluator will attempt to modify all security audit logs generated by the logging subsystem.
- Test 3: The evaluator will attempt to modify all shared libraries that are used throughout the system.
- Test 4: The evaluator will attempt to modify all system executables.
- Test 5: The evaluator will attempt to modify all system configuration files.
- Test 6: The evaluator will attempt to modify any additional components selected.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

- Test 1: The evaluator attempted to modify kernel drivers and modules using an unprivileged user account and was denied.
- Test 2: The evaluator attempted to modify security audit logs using an unprivileged user account and was denied.
- Test 3: The evaluator attempted to modify shared libraries using an unprivileged user account and was denied.
- Test 4: The evaluator attempted to modify system executables using an unprivileged user account and was denied.
- Test 5: The evaluator attempted to modify system configuration files using an unprivileged user account and was denied.
- Test 6: N/A. Additional components are not selected.

---

**FPT\_ACF\_EXT.1.2**

The evaluator will create an unprivileged user account. Using this account, the evaluator will ensure that the following tests result in a negative outcome (i.e., the action results in the OS denying the evaluator permission to complete the action):

- Test 1: The evaluator will attempt to read security audit logs generated by the auditing subsystem
- Test 2: The evaluator will attempt to read system-wide credential repositories
- Test 3: The evaluator will attempt to read any other object specified in the assignment

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

- Test 1: The evaluator attempted to read security audit logs using an unprivileged user account and was denied.
- Test 2: The evaluator attempted to read system-wide credential repositories using an unprivileged user account and was denied.
- Test 3: N/A. No other objects are specified.

## 2.4.2 FPT\_ASLR\_EXT.1 Address Space Layout Randomization

### 2.4.2.1 Test Assurance Activity

The evaluator will select 3 executables included with the TSF. If the TSF includes a web browser it must be selected. If the TSF includes a mail client, it must be selected. For each of these apps, the evaluator will launch the same executables on two separate instances of the OS on identical hardware and compare all memory mapping locations. The evaluator will ensure that no memory mappings are placed in the same location. If the rare chance occurs that two mappings are the same for a single executable and not the same for the other two, the evaluator will repeat the test with that executable to verify that in the second test the mappings are different. This test can also be completed on the same hardware and rebooting between application launches.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**



The evaluator chose 3 executables and determined the memory mapping of each. After re-booting the TOE, it was verified that the memory mapping was different for each executable.

### 2.4.3 FPT\_SBOP\_EXT.1 Stack Buffer Overflow Protection

#### 2.4.3.1 TSS Assurance Activity

For stack-based OSeS, the evaluator will determine that the TSS contains a description of stack-based buffer overflow protections used by the OS. These are referred to by a variety of terms, such as stack cookie, stack guard, and stack canaries. The TSS must include a rationale for any binaries that are not protected in this manner.

For OSeS that store parameters/variables separately from control flow values, the evaluator will verify that the TSS describes what data structures control values, parameters, and variables are stored. The evaluator will also ensure that the TSS includes a description of the safeguards that ensure parameters and variables do not intermix with control flow values.

#### Evaluator Assessment:

The evaluator verified that the TSS contains a description of the stack-based buffer overflow protections used by the OS. The FPT\_SBOP\_EXT.1 entry in Table 18 in Section 7 of the [ST] provides a list of libraries that were not compiled with stack-based protections and rationale as to why the protections are not required.

#### 2.4.3.2 Test Assurance Activity

For stack-based OSeS, the evaluator will perform the following test:

The evaluator will inventory the kernel, libraries, and application binaries to determine those that do not implement stack-based buffer overflow protections. This list should match up with the list provided in the TSS.

#### Evaluator Assessment:

The evaluator analyzed the kernel and application libraries to determine which ones did not include stack-based buffer overflow protections. The list provided in the TSS in Section 7 of the [ST] matches the results found by the evaluator.

### 2.4.4 FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 Boot Integrity

#### 2.4.4.1 TSS Assurance Activity

The evaluator will verify that the TSS section of the ST includes a comprehensive description of the boot procedures, including a description of the entire bootchain, for the TSF.

For each additional category of executable code verified before execution, the evaluator will verify that the description in the TSS describes how that software is cryptographically verified

The evaluator will verify that the TSS contains a description of the protection afforded to the mechanism performing the cryptographic verification.

#### Evaluator Assessment:

The evaluator verified that the TSS in Table 18 of Section 7 of the [ST] includes a detailed description of the procedures that occur on boot for the operating system. On boot, the BIOS performs self-tests and then reads the Master Boot Record. Two stages of bootloader then follow (the first stage verifies the keys for GRUB2, and then GRUB2 is loaded). The bootloader then loads the kernel into memory. The kernel is then responsible for loading all the driver modules and executing initial processes (e.g., systemd, /sbin/init). The user space starts after the kernel boot process is complete. The software is tested for integrity using HMAC-SHA-



256.

For more detail on the boot process, please see Table 18 (FPT\_TST\_EXT.1) in Section 7 of the [ST].

#### 2.4.4.2 Test Assurance Activity

The evaluator will perform the following tests:

Test 1: The evaluator will perform actions to cause TSF software to load and observe that the integrity mechanism does not flag any executables as containing integrity errors and that the OS properly boots.

##### Evaluator Assessment:

Test 1: The evaluator rebooted the device and verified that the TOE loads without any errors.

Test 2: The evaluator will modify a TSF executable that is part of the bootchain verified by the TSF (i.e. Not the first-stage bootloader) and attempt to boot. The evaluator will ensure that an integrity violation is triggered and the OS does not boot (Care must be taken so that the integrity violation is determined to be the cause of the failure to load the module, and not the fact that in such a way to invalidate the structure of the module.).

##### Evaluator Assessment:

Test 2: The evaluator modified a file that was part of the bootchain and verified that an integrity violation occurs on boot of the TOE. The OS did not boot after the modification.

Test 3: [conditional]: If the ST author indicates that the integrity verification is performed using a public key in an X509 certificate, the evaluator will verify that the boot integrity mechanism includes a certificate validation according to FIA\_X509\_EXT.1 or all certificates in the chain from the certificate used for boot integrity to a certificate in the trust store that are not themselves in the trust store. This means that, for each X509 certificate in this chain that is not a trust store element, the evaluator must ensure that revocation information is available to the TOE during the bootstrap mechanism (before the TOE becomes fully operational).

##### Evaluator Assessment:

Test 3: N/A. The TOE uses a digital signature.

#### 2.4.5 FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 Trusted Update

##### FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.1

#### 2.4.5.1 Test Assurance Activity

##### FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.1

The evaluator will check for an update using procedures described in the documentation and verify that the OS provides a list of available updates. Testing this capability may require installing and temporarily placing the system into a configuration in conflict with secure configuration guidance which specifies automatic update.

The evaluator is also to ensure that the response to this query is authentic by using a digital signature scheme specified in FCS\_COP.1(3). The digital signature verification may be performed as part of a network protocol as described in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1. If the signature verification is not performed as part of a trusted channel, the evaluator shall send a query response with a bad signature and verify that the signature verification fails. The evaluator shall then send a query response with a good signature and





verify that the signature verification is successful.

### **Evaluator Assessment:**

The evaluator initiated a check for updates from the Oracle repository and verified that a list of updates is provided over a secure connection.

#### **FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.2**

##### **FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.2**

Test 1: The evaluator will ensure that the update has a digital signature belonging to the vendor prior to its installation. The evaluator will modify the downloaded update in such a way that the digital signature is no longer valid. The evaluator will then attempt to install the modified update. The evaluator will ensure that the OS does not install the modified update.

### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: The evaluator modified the digital signature of the RPM package that was downloaded and attempted to install the modified package. The evaluator verified that the update is not installed after the modification.

Test 2: The evaluator will ensure that the update has a digital signature belonging to the vendor. The evaluator will then attempt to install the update (or permit installation to continue). The evaluator will ensure that the OS successfully installs the update.

### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 2: The evaluator attempted to install a valid package and verified that it was accepted.

## **2.4.6 FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2 Trusted Update for Application Software**

### **2.4.6.1 Test Assurance Activity**

#### **FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2.1**

The evaluator will check for updates to application software using procedures described in the documentation and verify that the OS provides a list of available updates. Testing this capability may require temporarily placing the system into a configuration in conflict with secure configuration guidance which specifies automatic update.

The evaluator is also to ensure that the response to this query is authentic by using a digital signature scheme specified in FCS\_COP.1(3). The digital signature verification may be performed as part of a network protocol as described in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1. If the signature verification is not performed as part of a trusted channel, the evaluator shall send a query response with a bad signature and verify that the signature verification fails. The evaluator shall then send a query response with a good signature and verify that the signature verification is successful.

### **Evaluator Assessment:**

This test is satisfied by FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.1 as the TOE uses the same mechanism for update of applications as for the OS.

#### **FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2.2**

The evaluator will initiate an update to an application. This may vary depending on the application, but it could be through the application vendor's website, a commercial app store, or another system. All origins supported by the OS must be indicated in the TSS and evaluated. However, this only includes those mechanisms for which the OS is providing a trusted installation and update functionality. It does not include user or administrator-driven download and installation of arbitrary files.



Test 1: The evaluator will ensure that the update has a digital signature which chains to the OS vendor or another trusted root managed through the OS. The evaluator will modify the downloaded update in such a way that the digital signature is no longer valid. The evaluator will then attempt to install the modified update. The evaluator will ensure that the OS does not install the modified update.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: The evaluator modified the digital signature of the RPM package that was downloaded and attempted to install the modified package. The evaluator verified that the update is not installed after the modification.

---

FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2.2

Test 2: The evaluator will ensure that the update has a digital signature belonging to the OS vendor or another trusted root managed through the OS. The evaluator will then attempt to install the update. The evaluator will ensure that the OS successfully installs the update.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 2: The evaluator attempted to install a valid package and verified that it was accepted.

## **2.5 Security Audit (FAU)**

### **2.5.1 FAU\_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation (Refined)**

#### **2.5.1.1 Guidance Assurance Activities**

---

FAU\_GEN.1.1

The evaluator will check the administrative guide and ensure that it lists all of the auditable events. The evaluator will check to make sure that every audit event type selected in the ST is included.

FAU\_GEN.1.2

The evaluator will check the administrative guide and ensure that it provides a format for audit records. Each audit record format type must be covered, along with a brief description of each field. The evaluator will ensure that the fields contains the information required.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

FAU\_GEN.1.1

Section 19 of the [AGD] lists all the auditable events. The evaluator verified that the audit events types listed in the ST are included in the [AGD].

FAU\_GEN 1.2

Section 19 of the [AGD] provides samples of each type of audit record and a description of each of the fields for these records.

#### **2.5.1.2 Test Assurance Activity**

---

FAU\_GEN.1.1:

The evaluator will test the OS's ability to correctly generate audit records by having the TOE generate audit records for the events listed in the ST. This should include all instance types of an event specified. When verifying the test results, the evaluator will



ensure the audit records generated during testing match the format specified in the administrative guide, and that the fields in each audit records have the proper entries.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

The evaluator used various configuration changes and actions to cause the TOE to generate audit records. The evaluator verified that the audit records that were generated match the format that was specified in the guidance.

---

#### **FAU\_GEN.1.2:**

The evaluator shall test the OS's ability to correctly generate audit records by having the TOE generate audit records for the events listed in the ST. The evaluator will ensure the audit records generated during testing match the format specified in the administrative guide, and that the fields in each audit record provide the required information

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

The evaluator performed actions on the TOE to generated audit records for events listed in the ST. The evaluator ensured the records generated matched the format specified in Section 18 of the [AGD] document.

## **2.6 Identification and Authentication (FIA)**

### **2.6.1 FIA\_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling (Refined)**

#### **2.6.1.1 Test Assurance Activity**

---

##### **FIA\_AFL.1.1**

The evaluator will set an administrator-configurable threshold for failed attempts, or note the ST-specified assignment. The evaluator will then (per selection) repeatedly attempt to authenticate with an incorrect password, PIN, or certificate until the number of attempts reaches the threshold. Note that the authentication attempts and lockouts must also be logged as specified in FAU\_GEN.1.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

The evaluator attempted to log into the TOE several times with invalid credentials and verified that after the configured threshold was passed, the user was locked out. The failed attempts and lockout were logged.

---

##### **FIA\_AFL.1.2**

Test 1: The evaluator will attempt to authenticate repeatedly to the system with a known bad password. Once the defined number of failed authentication attempts has been reached the evaluator will ensure that the account that was being used for testing has had the actions detailed in the assignment list above applied to it. The evaluator will ensure that an event has been logged to the security event log detailing that the account has had these actions applied.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: The evaluator attempted to log into the TOE several times with invalid credentials and verified that after the configured threshold was passed, the user was locked out. The failed attempts and lockout were logged.

---

Test 2: The evaluator will attempt to authenticate repeatedly to the system with a known bad certificate. Once the defined number



of failed authentication attempts has been reached the evaluator will ensure that the account that was being used for testing has had the actions detailed in the assignment list above applied to it. The evaluator will ensure that an event has been logged to the security event log detailing that the account has had these actions applied.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 2: N/A. Certificates are not utilized for authentication.

Test 3: The evaluator will attempt to authenticate repeatedly to the system using both a bad password and a bad certificate. Once the defined number of failed authentication attempts has been reached the evaluator will ensure that the account that was being used for testing has had the actions detailed in the assignment list above applied to it. The evaluator will ensure that an event has been logged to the security event log detailing that the account has had these actions applied.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 3: N/A. Certificates are not utilized for authentication.

## **2.6.2 FIA\_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms (Refined)**

### **2.6.2.1 TSS Assurance Activity**

FIA\_UAU.5.2

The evaluator will ensure that the TSS describes each mechanism provided to support user authentication and the rules describing how the authentication mechanism(s) provide authentication.

For all authentication mechanisms specified in FIA\_UAU.5.1, the TSS shall describe the rules as to how each authentication mechanism is used. Example rules are how the authentication mechanism authenticates the user (i.e. how does the TSF verify that the correct password or authentication factor is used), the result of a successful authentication (i.e. is the user input used to derive or unlock a key) and which authentication mechanisms can be used at which authentication factor (interfaces (i.e. if there are times, for example, after a reboot, that only specific authentication mechanisms can be used). Rules regarding how the authentication factors interact in terms of unsuccessful authentication are covered in FIA\_AFL.1.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Table 18 in Section 7 of the [ST] states that the TOE supports authentication based on username/password and public key. The OS includes the Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) authentication mechanism. PAM validates that a specified account is valid (and not expired), and that the password provided for that account is valid.

### **2.6.2.2 Guidance Documentation Assurance Activity**

FIA\_UAU.5.2

The evaluator will verify that configuration guidance for each authentication mechanism is addressed in the AGD guidance.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

The evaluator examined the [AGD] document and verified that guidance for the configuration of authentication mechanisms are addressed in Section 8 - Configuring User Authentication and Section 5.3 Using Public Key Authentication.

### **2.6.2.3 Test Assurance Activity**

If user name and password authentication is selected, the evaluator will configure the OS with a known user name and password and conduct the following tests:

Test 1: The evaluator will attempt to authenticate to the OS using the known user name and password. The evaluator will ensure



that the authentication attempt is successful.

Test 2: The evaluator will attempt to authenticate to the OS using the known user name but an incorrect password. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt is unsuccessful.

### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: The evaluator attempted to authenticate to the OS using valid login credentials and was successful.

Test2: The evaluator attempted to authenticate to the OS using a valid username with incorrect password and the attempt was unsuccessful.

#### **FIA\_UAU.5.1**

If user name and PIN that releases an asymmetric key is selected, the evaluator will examine the TSS for guidance on supported protected storage and will then configure the TOE or OE to establish a PIN which enables release of the asymmetric key from the protected storage (such as a TPM, a hardware token, or isolated execution environment) with which the OS can interface. The evaluator will then conduct the following tests:

Test 1: The evaluator will attempt to authenticate to the OS using the known user name and PIN. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt is successful.

Test 2: The evaluator will attempt to authenticate to the OS using the known user name but an incorrect PIN. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt is unsuccessful.

### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: N/A. The TOE does use a PIN for authentication.

Test 2: N/A. The TOE does use a PIN for authentication.

If X.509 certificate authentication is selected, the evaluator will generate an X.509v3 certificate for a user with the Client Authentication Enhanced Key Usage field set. The evaluator *will* provision the OS for authentication with the X.509v3 certificate. The evaluator will ensure that the certificates are validated by the OS as per FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1 and then conduct the following tests:

Test 1: The evaluator will attempt to authenticate to the OS using the X.509v3 certificate. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt is successful.

Test 2: The evaluator will generate a second certificate identical to the first except for the public key and any values derived from the public key. The evaluator will attempt to authenticate to the OS with this certificate. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt is unsuccessful.

### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: N/A. The TOE does not use x509 certificates for authentication.

Test 2: N/A. The TOE does not use x509 certificates for authentication.

#### **FIA\_UAU.5.2**

Test 1: For each authentication mechanism selected, the evaluator will enable that mechanism and verify that it can be used to authenticate the user at the specified authentication factor interfaces.

Test 2: For each authentication mechanism rule, the evaluator will ensure that the authentication mechanism(s) behave as documented in the TSS.



### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: The evaluator utilized each available interface to connect to the TOE.

Test 2: This test is satisfied by FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1 and FIA\_UAU.5.

## **2.6.3 FIA\_X509\_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation**

### **2.6.3.1 TSS Assurance Activity**

---

The evaluator will ensure the TSS describes where the check of validity of the certificates takes place. The evaluator ensures the TSS also provides a description of the certificate path validation algorithm.

---

### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Section 7 of the [ST] states that the certificate path validation algorithm used is defined in RFC 5280.

### **2.6.3.2 Test Assurance Activity**

---

#### **FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1**

The tests described must be performed in conjunction with the other certificate services evaluation activities, including the functions in FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1. The tests for the extendedKeyUsage rules are performed in conjunction with the uses that require those rules. The evaluator will create a chain of at least four certificates: the node certificate to be tested, two Intermediate CAs, and the self-signed Root CA.

Test 1: The evaluator shall demonstrate that validating a certificate without a valid certification path results in the function failing, for each of the following reasons, in turn:

- by establishing a certificate path in which one of the issuing certificates is not a CA certificate,
- by omitting the basicConstraints field in one of the issuing certificates,
- by setting the basicConstraints field in an issuing certificate to have CA=False,
- by omitting the CA signing bit of the key usage field in an issuing certificate, and
- by setting the path length field of a valid CA field to a value strictly less than the certificate path.

The evaluator shall then establish a valid certificate path consisting of valid CA certificates, and demonstrate that the function succeeds. The evaluator shall then remove trust in one of the CA certificates, and show that the function fails.

---

### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1:

The evaluator configured the TOE to connect to a remote TLS server that offers a CA certificate using a certification path in which one of the issuing certificates was not a CA certificate and verified the connection failed.

The evaluator configured the TOE to connect to a remote TLS server that offers a CA certificate using a certification path in which the basicConstraints field was omitted in one of the certificates and verified the connection failed.

The evaluator configured the TOE to connect to a remote TLS server that offers a CA certificate using a certification path in which the basicConstraints field included CA=false in one of the certificates and verified the connection failed.

The evaluator configured the TOE to connect to a remote TLS server that offers a CA certificate using a certification path in which the CA signing bit was omitted in one of the certificates and verified the connection failed.



The evaluator configured the TOE to connect to a remote TLS server that offers a CA certificate using a certification path in which the path length field in one of the certificates was set to a value less than the certification path. The connection failed.

The evaluator established a connection to a remote TLS server with a certificate path consisting of valid CA certificates and verified the connection succeeds.

The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote TLS server with the trust in one of the CA certificates removed and verified the connection fails.

---

Test 2: The evaluator will demonstrate that validating an expired certificate results in the function failing.

---

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 2: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote TLS server using an expired certificate and verified that the connection failed.

---

Test 3: The evaluator will test that the OS can properly handle revoked certificates - conditional on whether CRL, OCSP, OCSP stapling, or OCSP multi-stapling is selected; if multiple methods are selected, then a test shall be performed for each method. The evaluator will test revocation of the node certificate and revocation of the intermediate CA certificate (i.e. the intermediate CA certificate should be revoked by the root CA). If OCSP stapling per RFC 6066 is the only supported revocation method, testing revocation of the intermediate CA certificate is omitted. The evaluator will ensure that a valid certificate is used, and that the validation function succeeds. The evaluator then attempts the test with a certificate that has been revoked (for each method chosen in the selection) to ensure when the certificate is no longer valid that the validation function fails.

---

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 3: The evaluator confirmed that a successful connection can be made to a remote TLS server with a valid certificate chain. The evaluator then attempted to connect to a remote TLS server in which the intermediate CA certificate has been revoked and verified that the connection fails.

Testing of the revoked node certificate is satisfied by FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.3 Test #2.

---

Test 4: If any OCSP option is selected, the evaluator shall configure the OCSP server or use a man-in-the-middle tool to present a certificate that does not have the OCSP signing purpose and verify that validation of the OCSP response fails. If CRL is selected, the evaluator shall configure the CA to sign a CRL with a certificate that does not have the cRLsign key usage bit set and verify that validation of the CRL fails.

---

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 4: The evaluator configured the CA to sign a CRL with a certificate that did not have the cRLsign key usage bit set. Attempting to validate the CRL when connecting to the TLS server failed.

---

Test 5: The evaluator shall modify any byte in the first eight bytes of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The certificate will fail to parse correctly.)

---

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 5: The evaluator attempted to make a connection to a remote TLS server that presents a certificate in which one of the first eight bytes is modified. The connection fails.



---

Test 6: The evaluator shall modify any byte in the last byte of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The signature on the certificate will not validate.)

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 6: The evaluator attempted to make a connection to a remote TLS server that presents a certificate in which the last byte is modified. The connection fails.

---

Test 7: The evaluator shall modify any byte in the public key of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The signature of the certificate will not validate.)

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 7: The evaluator attempted to make a connection to a remote TLS server that presents a certificate in which one of the bytes is modified. The connection fails.

---

Test 8a: (Conditional on support for EC certificates as indicated in FCS\_COP.1(3)). The evaluator shall establish a valid, trusted certificate chain consisting of an EC leaf certificate, an EC Intermediate CA certificate not designated as a trust anchor, and an EC certificate designated as a trusted anchor, where the elliptic curve parameters are specified as a named curve. The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE validates the certificate chain.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 8a: N/A. EC certificate support is not claimed.

---

Test 8b: (Conditional on support for EC certificates as indicated in FCS\_COP.1(3)). The evaluator shall replace the intermediate certificate in the certificate chain for Test 8a with a modified certificate, where the modified intermediate CA has a public key information field where the EC parameters uses an explicit format version of the Elliptic Curve parameters in the public key information field of the intermediate CA certificate from Test 8a, and the modified Intermediate CA certificate is signed by the trusted EC root CA, but having no other changes. The evaluator shall confirm the TOE treats the certificate as invalid.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 8b: N/A. EC certificate support is not claimed.

---

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.2**

The tests described must be performed in conjunction with the other certificate services evaluation activities, including the functions in FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1. The evaluator will create a chain of at least four certificates: the node certificate to be tested, two Intermediate CAs, and the self-signed Root CA.

Test 1: The evaluator will construct a certificate path, such that the certificate of the CA issuing the OS's certificate does not contain the basicConstraints extension. The validation of the certificate path fails.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: Test is satisfied by updated requirements for FIA\_x509\_EXT.1.1 Test 1.

---

Test 2: The evaluator will construct a certificate path, such that the certificate of the CA issuing the OS's certificate has the CA flag in the basicConstraints extension not set. The validation of the certificate path fails.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 2: Test is satisfied by updated requirements for FIA\_x509\_EXT.1.1 Test 1.





---

Test 3: The evaluator will construct a certificate path, such that the certificate of the CA issuing the OS's certificate has the CA flag in the basicConstraints extension set to TRUE. The validation of the certificate path succeeds.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 3: Test is satisfied by updated requirements for FIA\_x509\_EXT.1.1 Test 1.

## **2.6.4 FIA\_X509\_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication**

### **2.6.4.1 Test Assurance Activity**

---

The evaluator will acquire or develop an application that uses the OS TLS mechanism with an X.509v3 certificate. The evaluator will then run the application and ensure that the provided certificate is used to authenticate the connection.

The evaluator will repeat the activity for any other selections listed.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

This test is satisfied by testing performed for FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.1.

## **2.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)**

### **2.7.1 FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Trusted channel communications**

#### **2.7.1.1 Test Assurance Activity**

---

The evaluator will configure the OS to communicate with another trusted IT product as identified in the second selection. The evaluator will monitor network traffic while the OS performs communication with each of the servers identified in the second selection. The evaluator will ensure that for each session a trusted channel was established in conformance with the protocols selected identified in the first selection.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

This test is satisfied by FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1 Test #1.

### **2.7.2 FTP\_TRP.1 Trusted Path**

#### **2.7.2.1 TSS Assurance Activity**

---

The evaluator will examine the TSS to determine that the methods of remote OS administration are indicated, along with how those communications are protected. The evaluator will also confirm that all protocols listed in the TSS in support of OS administration are consistent with those specified in the requirement, and are included in the requirements in the ST.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

The methods of remote administration supported are a command line interface available through SSHv2. The protocols listed in the OS are consistent with those specified in the requirement.



### 2.7.2.2 Guidance Documentation Assurance Activity

The evaluator will confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for establishing the remote administrative sessions for each supported method.

#### Evaluator Assessment:

Section 5 of the [AGD] provides instructions for establishing the remote administrative sessions.

### 2.7.2.3 Test Assurance Activity

The evaluator will also perform the following tests:

Test 1: The evaluator will ensure that communications using each remote administration method is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the operational guidance and ensuring that communication is successful.

#### Evaluator Assessment:

Test 1: This test is satisfied by FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.

Test 2: For each method of remote administration supported, the evaluator will follow the operational guidance to ensure that there is no available interface that can be used by a remote user to establish a remote administrative sessions without invoking the trusted path.

#### Evaluator Assessment:

Test 2: The evaluator has verified that the TOE only allows the trusted path to be used for remote administration over SSH.

Test 3: The evaluator will ensure, for each method of remote administration, the channel data is not sent in plaintext.

#### Evaluator Assessment:

Test 3: Testing for FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1 satisfies this requirement.

Test 4: The evaluator will ensure, for each method of remote administration, modification of the channel data is detected by the OS.

#### Evaluator Assessment:

Test 4: The evaluator initiated an SSH connection and then used a Man-In-The-Middle attack to modify a packet. The modification of the packet was detected.



## 3 Evaluation Activities for Optional Requirements

### 3.1 User Data Protection (FDP)

#### 3.1.1 FDP\_IFC\_EXT.1 Information flow control

##### 3.1.1.1 TSS Assurance Activity

The evaluator will verify that the TSS section of the ST describes the routing of IP traffic when a VPN client is enabled. The evaluator will ensure that the description indicates which traffic does not go through the VPN and which traffic does, and that a configuration exists for each in which only the traffic identified by the ST author as necessary for establishing the CPN connection (IKE traffic and perhaps HTTPS or DNS traffic) is not encapsulated by the VPN protocol (IPsec).

##### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Section 7 of the [ST] states that the TOE provides the XFRM framework with the XFRM netlink interface and it also provides the TUN/TAP interface for supporting user-space VPN clients operating at ISO/OSI level 2 or 3. Only IP traffic goes through the VPN and other traffic (DNS, etc) do not go through the VPN.

##### 3.1.1.2 Test Assurance Activity

The evaluator will perform the following test:

Test 1:

Step 1: The evaluator will enable a network connection. The evaluator will sniff packets while performing running applications that use the network such as web browsers and email clients. The evaluator will verify that the sniffer captures the traffic generated by these actions, turn off the sniffing tool, and save the session data.

Step 2: The evaluator will configure an IPsec VPN client that supports the routing specified in this requirement. The evaluator will turn on the sniffing tool, establish the VPN connection, and perform the same actions with the device as performed in the first step. The evaluator will verify that the sniffing tool captures traffic generated by these actions, turn off the sniffing tool, and save the session data.

Step 3: The evaluator will examine the traffic from both step one and step two to verify that all non-expected Data Plane traffic in Step 2 is encapsulated by IPsec. The evaluator will examine the Security Parameter Index (SPI) value present in the encapsulated packets captured in Step 2 from the TOE to the Gateway and shall verify this value is the same for all actions used to generate traffic through the VPN. Note that it is expected that the SPI value for packets from the Gateway to the TOE is different than the SPI value for packets from the TOE to the Gateway.

Step 4: The evaluator will perform a ping on the TOE host on the local network and verify that no packets sent are captured with the sniffer. The evaluator will attempt to send packets to the TOE outside the VPN tunnel (i.e. no through the VPN gateway), including from the local network, and verify that the TOE discards them.

##### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1:

Step 1: The evaluator used a packet sniffer to capture traffic generated by an HTTP request and verified that the packets were captured.

Step 2: The evaluator repeated the actions performed in step 1 of the test after configuring the IPsec VPN client and verified that the generated traffic was captured.

Step 3: The evaluator examined the traffic generated in step 2 and verified that all non-expected Data Plane traffic is encapsulated by IPsec. The SPI values present in the encapsulated packets were examined and verified to be accurate.

Step 4: The evaluator performed a ping on the TOE host from a host on the local network and verified that there was no response from the TOE in the packet capture. The evaluator attempted to send packets to the TOE outside the VPN tunnel and



verified that they are discarded.

## 4 Evaluation Activities for Selection-Based Requirements

None Selected.

## 5 Security Assurance Requirement Activities

### 5.1 *ADV: Development*

#### 5.1.1 Basic Functional Specification (ADV\_FSP.1)

##### 5.1.1.1 Evaluation Activity:

*There are no specific evaluation activities associated with these SARs, except ensuring the information is provided. The functional specification documentation is provided to support the evaluation activities described in Section 5.1 of the OS PP, and other activities described for AGD, ATE, and AVA SARs. The requirements on the content of the functional specification information is implicitly assessed by virtue of the other evaluation activities being performed; if the evaluator is unable to perform an activity because there is insufficient interface information, then an adequate functional specification has not been provided.*

##### **Evaluator Assessment:**

The ST and TOE guidance documentation provides specification of the interfaces, and associated management functions in enough detail to perform the assurance activities that are specified.

### 5.2 *AGD: Guidance Documentation*

#### 5.2.1 Operational User Guidance (AGD\_OPE.1)

##### 5.2.1.1 Evaluation Activity:

Some of the contents of the operational guidance are verified by the evaluation activities in Section 5.1 and evaluation of the OS according to the [CEM]. The following additional information is also required. If cryptographic functions are provided by the OS, the operational guidance shall contain instructions for configuring the cryptographic engine associated with the evaluated configuration of the OS. It shall provide a warning to the administrator that use of other cryptographic engines was not evaluated nor tested during the CC evaluation of the OS. The documentation must describe the process for verifying updates to the OS by verifying a digital signature – this may be done by the OS or the underlying platform. The evaluator will verify that this process includes the following steps: Instructions for obtaining the update itself. This should include instructions for making the update accessible to the OS (e.g., placement in a specific directory). Instructions for initiating the update process, as well as discerning whether the process was successful or unsuccessful. This includes generation of the hash/digital signature. The OS will likely contain security functionality that does not fall in the scope of evaluation under this PP. The operational guidance shall make it clear to an administrator which security functionality is covered by the evaluation activities.

##### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Section 4 of the [AGD] provides instructions for configuring the TOE in the evaluated configuration. Section 6 of the [AGD] provides instructions for configuration of TLS in the evaluated configuration as well as the directive to not use ECC certificates. Section 17 of the [AGD] describes the process for retrieving and applying updates to the OS as well as instructions to configure automatic updates for the system.



## 5.2.2 Preparative Procedures (AGD\_PRE.1)

### 5.2.2.1 Evaluation Activity:

As indicated in the introduction above, there are significant expectations with respect to the documentation—especially when configuring the operational environment to support OS functional requirements. The evaluator shall check to ensure that the guidance provided for the OS adequately addresses all platforms claimed for the OS in the ST.

#### Evaluator Assessment:

The evaluator was able to successfully use the provided guidance documentation to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration for all platforms claimed in the ST.

## 5.3 ALC: Life-Cycle Support

### 5.3.1 Labeling of the TOE (ALC\_CMC.1)

The evaluator will check the ST to ensure that it contains an identifier (such as a product name/version number) that specifically identifies the version that meets the requirements of the ST. Further, the evaluator will check the AGD guidance and OS samples received for testing to ensure that the version number is consistent with that in the ST. If the vendor maintains a web site advertising the OS, the evaluator will examine the information on the web site to ensure that the information in the ST is sufficient to distinguish the product.

#### Evaluator Assessment:

Section 1.1 of the [ST] provides the identifier for TOE. The evaluator also verified that the TOE version referenced in the [AGD], [ST], and the TOE itself are consistent and sufficient to distinguish the product from other products.

### 5.3.2 TOE CM Coverage (ALC\_CMS.1)

*The "evaluation evidence required by the SARs" in this PP is limited to the information in the ST coupled with the guidance provided to administrators and users under the AGD requirements. By ensuring that the OS is specifically identified, and that this identification is consistent in the ST and in the AGD guidance (as done in the evaluation activity for ALC\_CMC.1), the evaluator implicitly confirms the information required by this component. Life-cycle support is targeted aspects of the developer's life-cycle and instructions to providers of applications for the developer's devices, rather than an in-depth examination of the TSF manufacturer's development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical role that a developer's practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a product; rather, it's a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation.*

*The evaluator will ensure that the developer has identified (in guidance documentation for application developers concerning the targeted platform) one or more development environments appropriate for use in developing applications for the developer's platform. For each of these development environments, the developer shall provide information on how to configure the environment to ensure that buffer overflow protection mechanisms in the environment(s) are invoked (e.g., compiler and linker flags). The evaluator will ensure that this documentation also includes an indication of whether such protections are on by default, or have to be specifically enabled. The evaluator will ensure that the TSF is uniquely identified (with respect to other products from the TSF vendor), and that documentation provided by the developer in association with the requirements in the ST is associated with the TSF using this unique identification.*

#### Evaluator Assessment:

The evaluator has verified that the TOE matches the version listed in the [ST] and [AGD] documents. Section 16 in the [AGD] provides information on how to configure the environment to ensure that buffer overflow protection mechanisms in the environment(s) are invoked.



### 5.3.3 Timely Security Updates (ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1)

*The evaluator will verify that the TSS contains a description of the timely security update process used by the developer to create and deploy security updates. The evaluator will verify that this description addresses the entire application.*

*The evaluator will also verify that, in addition to the OS developer's process, any third-party processes are also addressed in the description. The evaluator will also verify that each mechanism for deployment of security updates is described. The evaluator will verify that, for each deployment mechanism described for the update process, the TSS lists a time between public disclosure of a vulnerability and public availability of the security update to the OS patching this vulnerability, to include any third-party or carrier delays in deployment. The evaluator will verify that this time is expressed in a number or range of days.*

*The evaluator will verify that this description includes the publicly available mechanisms (including either an email address or website) for reporting security issues related to the OS. The evaluator shall verify that the description of this mechanism includes a method for protecting the report either using a public key for encrypting email or a trusted channel for a website*

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

The evaluator verified that the TSS entry for ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1 outlined in Section 7 of the [ST] provides a description of the timely security update process. The process in which security vulnerabilities can be reported to the developer is described in the TSS and web links are provided for these activities. Web links for published errata where users can track current vulnerabilities are also provided.

Oracle provides a mailing list that users can utilize for notification of security updates and an email address to submit security observations. Oracle also provides a public key to protect communication between the user and Oracle Security departments.

## 5.4 ATE: Tests

### 5.4.1 Independent Testing – Conformance (ATE\_IND.1)

#### 5.4.1.1 Evaluation Activity:

The evaluator will prepare a test plan and report documenting the testing aspects of the system, including any application crashes during testing. The evaluator shall determine the root cause of any application crashes and include that information in the report. The test plan covers all of the testing actions contained in the [CEM] and the body of this PP's evaluation activities.

While it is not necessary to have one test case per test listed in an evaluation activity, the evaluator must document in the test plan that each applicable testing requirement in the ST is covered. The test plan identifies the platforms to be tested, and for those platforms not included in the test plan but included in the ST, the test plan provides a justification for not testing the platforms. This justification must address the differences between the tested platforms and the untested platforms, and make an argument that the differences do not affect the testing to be performed. It is not sufficient to merely assert that the differences have no affect; rationale must be provided. If all platforms claimed in the ST are tested, then no rationale is necessary. The test plan describes the composition of each platform to be tested, and any setup that is necessary beyond what is contained in the AGD documentation. It should be noted that the evaluator is expected to follow the AGD documentation for installation and setup of each platform either as part of a test or as a standard pre-test condition. This may include special test drivers or tools. For each driver or tool, an argument (not just an assertion) should be provided that the driver or tool will not adversely affect the performance of the functionality by the OS and its platform.

This also includes the configuration of the cryptographic engine to be used. The cryptographic algorithms implemented by this engine are those specified by this PP and used by the cryptographic protocols being evaluated (IPsec, TLS). The test plan identifies high-level test objectives as well as the test procedures to be followed to achieve those objectives. These procedures include expected results.

The test report (which could just be an annotated version of the test plan) details the activities that took place when the test procedures were executed, and includes the actual results of the tests. This shall be a cumulative account, so if there was a test run that resulted in a failure; a fix installed; and then a successful re-run of the test, the report would show a "fail" and "pass" result (and the supporting details), and not just the "pass" result

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**



The evaluator performed testing on the TOE in the evaluated configuration outlined in the [ST] to satisfy each of the test requirements of the PP. The test plan and results have been provided in the Evaluation Test Plan, Procedures and test Results document.

## **5.5 AVA: Vulnerability Assessment**

### **5.5.1 Vulnerability Survey (AVA\_VAN.1)**

#### **5.5.1.1 Evaluation Activity:**

The evaluator will generate a report to document their findings with respect to this requirement. This report could physically be part of the overall test report mentioned in ATE\_IND, or a separate document. The evaluator performs a search of public information to find vulnerabilities that have been found in similar applications with a particular focus on network protocols the application uses and document formats it parses. The evaluator documents the sources consulted and the vulnerabilities found in the report.

For each vulnerability found, the evaluator either provides a rationale with respect to its non-applicability, or the evaluator formulates a test (using the guidelines provided in ATE\_IND) to confirm the vulnerability, if suitable. Suitability is determined by assessing the attack vector needed to take advantage of the vulnerability. If exploiting the vulnerability requires expert skills and an electron microscope, for instance, then a test would not be suitable and an appropriate justification would be formulated.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

The evaluator performed the following Vulnerability Assessment activities against the TOE in the evaluated configuration described in the [ST]:

- Full TCP and UDP port scans
- Vulnerability scan reports created
- Searches of public domain information on CVEs related to the TOE and its included cryptographic components

It has been determined that the TOE in its evaluated configuration is not susceptible to any known vulnerabilities. Results of the VA efforts have been provided in the Evaluation Test Plan, Procedures and Test Results document.

## **6 Additional Requirements for Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH)**

### **6.1 Security Requirements**

#### **6.1.1 FCS\_COP.1(1) /SSH Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption (Refined)**

##### **6.1.1.1 TSS Assurance Activity**

The evaluator shall review the TSF of the base PP to verify consistency with the functionality that was claimed by the base PP to ensure that applicable dependencies are met.

If perform encryption/decryption services is chosen, the evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the counter mechanism including rationale that the counter values provided are unique.

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

The evaluator verified that Section 7 of the [ST] describes the counter mechanism and has determined that the rationale for the



counter values being unique is sufficient. Due to the size of the counter (128 bits) and way that it is incremented, it would take a very long time before any single CTR value is re-used with a specific key.

### 6.1.1.2 Test Assurance Activity

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#### AES-CTR Tests:

##### Test 1: Known Answer Tests (KATs)

There are four Known Answer Tests (KATs) described below. For all KATs, the plaintext, IV, and ciphertext values shall be 128-bit blocks. The results from each test may either be obtained by the validator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.

To test the encrypt functionality, the evaluator shall supply a set of 10 plaintext values and obtain the ciphertext value that results from encryption of the given plaintext using a key value of all zeros and an IV of all zeros. Five plaintext values shall be encrypted with a 128-bit all zeros key, and the other five shall be encrypted with a 256-bit all zeros key. To test the decrypt functionality, the evaluator shall perform the same test as for encrypt, using 10 ciphertext values as input.

To test the encrypt functionality, the evaluator shall supply a set of 10 key values and obtain the ciphertext value that results from encryption of an all zeros plaintext using the given key value and an IV of all zeros. Five of the key values shall be 128-bit keys, and the other five shall be 256-bit keys. To test the decrypt functionality, the evaluator shall perform the same test as for encrypt, using an all zero ciphertext value as input.

To test the encrypt functionality, the evaluator shall supply the two sets of key values described below and obtain the ciphertext values that result from AES encryption of an all zeros plaintext using the given key values and an IV of all zeros. The first set of keys shall have 128 128-bit keys, and the second shall have 256 256-bit keys. Key<sub>i</sub> in each set shall have the leftmost *i* bits be ones and the rightmost *N-i* bits be zeros, for *i* in [1, *N*]. To test the decrypt functionality, the evaluator shall supply the two sets of key and ciphertext value pairs described below and obtain the plaintext value that results from decryption of the given ciphertext using the given key values and an IV of all zeros. The first set of key/ciphertext pairs shall have 128 128-bit key/ciphertext pairs, and the second set of key/ciphertext pairs shall have 256 256-bit pairs. Key<sub>i</sub> in each set shall have the leftmost *i* bits be ones and the rightmost *N-i* bits be zeros for *i* in [1, *N*]. The ciphertext value in each pair shall be the value that results in an all zeros plaintext when decrypted with its corresponding key.

To test the encrypt functionality, the evaluator shall supply the set of 128 plaintext values described below and obtain the two ciphertext values that result from encryption of the given plaintext using a 128-bit key value of all zeros and using a 256 bit key value of all zeros, respectively, and an IV of all zeros. Plaintext value *i* in each set shall have the leftmost bits be ones and the rightmost 128-*i* bits be zeros, for *i* in [1, 128]. To test the decrypt functionality, the evaluator shall perform the same test as for encrypt, using ciphertext values of the same form as the plaintext in the encrypt test as input.

---

#### Evaluator Assessment:

Testing is satisfied through the Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP). The cryptographic implementation used by the TOE received CAVP Cert # A1400.

---

#### Test 2: Multi-Block Message Test

The evaluator shall test the encrypt functionality by encrypting an *i*-block message where 1 less-than *i* less-than-or-equal to 10. For each *i* the evaluator shall choose a key, IV, and plaintext message of length *i* blocks and encrypt the message, using the mode to be tested, with the chosen key. The ciphertext shall be compared to the result of encrypting the same plaintext message with the same key and IV using a known good implementation. The evaluator shall also test the decrypt functionality by decrypting an *i*-block message where 1 less-than *i* less-than-or-equal to 10. For each *i* the evaluator shall choose a key and a ciphertext message of length *i* blocks and decrypt the message, using the mode to be tested, with the chosen key. The plaintext shall be compared to the result of decrypting the same ciphertext message with the same key using a known good implementation.

---

#### Evaluator Assessment:

Testing is satisfied through the Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP). The cryptographic implementation used by





the TOE received CAVP Cert # A1400.

---

### Test 3: Monte-Carlo Test

For AES-CTR mode perform the Monte Carlo Test for ECB Mode on the encryption engine of the counter mode implementation. There is no need to test the decryption engine.

The evaluator shall test the encrypt functionality using 200 plaintext/key pairs. 100 of these shall use 128 bit keys, and 100 of these shall use 256 bit keys. The plaintext values shall be 128-bit blocks. For each pair, 1000 iterations shall be run as follows:

```
For AES-ECB mode
# Input: PT, Key
for i = 1 to 1000:
  CT[i] = AES-ECB-Encrypt(Key, PT)
  PT = CT[i]
```

The ciphertext computed in the 1000th iteration is the result for that trial. This result shall be compared to the result of running 1000 iterations with the same values using a known good implementation.

---

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Testing is satisfied through the Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP). The cryptographic implementation used by the TOE received CAVP Cert # A1400.

---

If "invoke platform-provided" is selected, the evaluator confirms that SSH connections are only successful if appropriate algorithms and appropriate key sizes are configured. To do this, for each listening SSH socket connection on the TOE, the evaluator configures an SSH client to connect with an invalid cryptographic algorithm and key-size. The evaluator observes that the connection fails. Likewise, for initiated connection, the evaluator configures a listening SSH socket on the remote server that accepts only invalid cryptographic algorithms and keys. The evaluator observes that the connection fails.

---

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

N/A. The ST does not claim "invoke platform provided".

## **6.1.2 FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1 SSH Protocol**

### **6.1.2.1 TSS Assurance Activity**

---

The evaluator will ensure that the selections indicated in the ST are consistent with the selections in the dependent components.

---

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

RFC 6668 is selected which is consistent with the selection of the data integrity algorithms HMAC-SHA2-256 and HMAC-SHA2-512 in FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.5 and FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.5.



## 6.2 Selection-Based Requirements

### 6.2.1 FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1 SSH Protocol – Client

#### 6.2.1.1 TSS Assurance Activity

##### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.1

The evaluator will check to ensure that the TSS contains a description of the public key algorithms that are acceptable for use for authentication, that this list conforms to FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.4, and ensure that password-based authentication methods, if supported, are described.

##### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.2

The evaluator will check that the TSS describes how “large packets” in terms of RFC 4253 are detected and handled.

##### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.3

The evaluator will check the description of the implementation of this protocol in the TSS to ensure that optional characteristics are specified, and the encryption algorithms supported are specified as well. The evaluator will check the TSS to ensure that the encryption algorithms specified are identical to those listed for this component.

##### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.4

The evaluator will check the description of the implementation of this protocol in the TSS to ensure that optional characteristics are specified, and the public key algorithms supported are specified as well. The evaluator will check the TSS to ensure that the public key algorithms specified are identical to those listed for this component.

##### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.5

The evaluator will check the TSS to ensure that it lists the supported data integrity algorithms, and that that list corresponds to the list in this component.

##### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.6

The evaluator will check the TSS to ensure that it lists the supported key exchange algorithms, and that that list corresponds to the list in this component.

##### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.7

None defined.

##### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.8

None defined.

#### Evaluator Assessment:

##### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.1

The evaluator verified that the TSS identifies that the SSH-RSA algorithm is used for authentication. This list is consistent with the selections made in FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.4. Password-based authentication is supported by the OS.

##### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.2

Packets that exceed 262144 bytes are dropped at the application layer per RFC 4253. When an SSH packet is received, the packet length field is inspected. If the packet length is larger than the specified limit, the packet is dropped, and the connection is terminated.

##### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.3

Optional characteristics are not supported by the OS. The evaluator verified that for this requirement, the encryption algorithms selected are identical to those listed in the TSS. The supported encryption algorithms are AES128-CTR, AES256-CTR, AES128-CBC, and AES256-CBC.



#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.4

Optional characteristics are not supported by the OS. The evaluator verified that for this requirement, the public key algorithms selected are identical to those listed in the TSS. The supported public key algorithm is SSH-RSA.

#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.5

The TSS lists the following data integrity MAC algorithms: HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA2-256, and HMAC-SHA2-512. This list is identical to those listed for this component.

#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.6

The TSS lists the following key exchange algorithm: diffie-hellman-group14-sha1. This is identical to what is listed for this component.

### 6.2.1.2 Guidance Documentation Assurance Activity

#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.3

The evaluator will also check the guidance documentation to ensure that it contains instructions on configuring the TOE so that SSH conforms to the description in the TSS (for instance, the set of algorithms advertised by the TOE may have to be restricted to meet the requirements).

#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.4

The evaluator will also check the guidance documentation to ensure that it contains instructions on configuring the TOE so that SSH conforms to the description in the TSS (for instance, the set of algorithms advertised by the TOE may have to be restricted to meet the requirements).

#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.5

The evaluator will also check the guidance documentation to ensure that it contains instructions to the administrator on how to ensure that only the allowed data integrity algorithms are used in SSH connections with the TOE (specifically, that the "none" MAC algorithm is not allowed).

#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.6

The evaluator will also check the guidance documentation to ensure that it contains instructions to the administrator on how to ensure that only the allowed key exchange algorithms are used in SSH connections with the TOE.

#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.7

None defined.

#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.8

None defined.

### Evaluator Assessment:

#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.3

Section 5 of the [AGD] provides instructions on configuring the TOE such that it conforms to the description in the TSS.

#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.4

Section 5 of the [AGD] provides instructions on configuring the TOE such that it conforms to the description in the TSS.

#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.5

Section 5.2 of the [AGD] provides instructions that would allow the administrator to ensure only allowed data integrity algorithms are used in SSH connections with the TOE.

#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.6

Section 5.2 of the [AGD] provides instructions that would allow the administrator to ensure only allowed key exchange algorithms are used in SSH connections with the TOE.



### 6.2.1.3 Test Assurance Activity

---

#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.1

Test 1: The evaluator will, for each public key algorithm supported, show that the TOE supports the use of that public key algorithm to authenticate a user connection to an SSH server. Any configuration activities required to support this test shall be performed according to instructions in the guidance documentation.

Test 2 [conditional]: Using the guidance documentation, the evaluator will configure the TOE to perform password-based authentication to an SSH server, and demonstrate that a user can be successfully authenticated by the TOE to an SSH server using a password as an authenticator.

---

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote SSH server configured to use the TOE public key. The connection was successful.

Test 2: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote SSH server using a password as an authenticator. The connection was successful.

---

#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.2

The evaluator will demonstrate that if the TOE receives a packet larger than that specified in this component, that packet is dropped.

---

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

The evaluator made a connection to a remote SSH server that was configured to send a packet larger than the specified allowed size. The evaluator verified that the connection was terminated after receiving the packet.

---

#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.3

Test 1: The evaluator will establish an SSH connection using each of the encryption algorithms specified by the requirement. It is sufficient to observe (on the wire) the successful negotiation of the algorithm to satisfy the intent of the test.

Test 2: The evaluator will configure an SSH server to only allow the 3des-cbc encryption algorithm and no other encryption algorithms. The evaluator will attempt to establish an SSH connection from the TOE to the SSH server and observe that the connection is rejected.

---

#### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: The evaluator attempted to establish an SSH connection using each of the encryption algorithms specified and verified the connections were successful.

Test 2: The evaluator attempted to establish an SSH connection to a remote server configured to only allow the 3des-cbc encryption algorithm. The connection was rejected.

---

#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.4

Test 1: The evaluator will establish a SSH connection using each of the public key algorithms specified by the requirement to authenticate an SSH server to the TOE. It is sufficient to observe (on the wire) the successful negotiation of the algorithm to satisfy the intent of the test.

Test 2: The evaluator will configure an SSH server to only allow the ssh-dsa public key algorithm and no other public key algorithms. The evaluator will attempt to establish an SSH connection from the TOE to the SSH server and observe that the connection is rejected.

---



### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: The evaluator verified that an SSH connection to a remote server can be made using the specified public key algorithm.

Test 2: The evaluator attempted to connect to a remote SSH server configured to only allow the ssh-dsa public key algorithm and verified that the connection is rejected.

---

#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.5

Test 1: The evaluator will establish a SSH connection using each of the integrity algorithms specified by the requirement. It is sufficient to observe (on the wire) the successful negotiation of the algorithm to satisfy the intent of the test.

Test 2: The evaluator will configure an SSH server to only allow the "none" MAC algorithm. The evaluator will attempt to connect from the TOE to the SSH server and observe that the attempt fails.

Test 3: The evaluator will configure an SSH server to only allow the hmac- md5 MAC algorithm. The evaluator will attempt to connect from the TOE to the SSH server and observe that the attempt fails.

### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: The evaluator verified that an SSH connection to a remote server can be made using the specified integrity algorithms.

Test 2: The evaluator configured a remote SSH sever to only allow connections using the "none" MAC algorithm. While attempting to connect to the server from the TOE the connection was refused.

Test 3: The evaluator configured a remote SSH sever to only allow connections using the hmac-md5 MAC algorithm. While attempting to connect to the server from the TOE the connection was refused.

---

#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.6

Test 1: The evaluator will configure an SSH server to permit all allowed key exchange methods. The evaluator will attempt to connect from the TOE to the SSH server using each allowed key exchange method, and observe that each attempt succeeds.

### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: The evaluator configured a remote SSH server to permit all of the allowed key exchange methods and verified that a successful connection could be made from the TOE using each method.

---

#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.7

Test 1: The evaluator will configure the TOE to create a log entry when a rekey occurs. The evaluator will connect to the TOE with an SSH client and cause a rekey to occur according to the selection(s) in the ST, and subsequently the evaluator uses available methods and tools to verify that rekeying occurs. This could be done, e.g., by checking that a corresponding audit event has been generated by the TOE, if the TOE supports auditing of rekey events.

### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: The evaluator configured the remote SSH server to create a log entry when a rekey occurs. A successful SSH connection was then made from the TOE to the server. The evaluator verified by checking the audit log that the rekey occurs before the specified limit stated in the ST.

---

#### FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.8

Test 1: The evaluator will delete all entries in the TOE's list of recognized SSH server host keys and, if selected, all entries in the TOE's list of trusted certification authorities. The evaluator will initiate a connection from the TOE to an SSH server. The evaluator shall ensure that the TOE either rejects the connection or displays the SSH server's public key (either the key bytes themselves or a hash of the key using any allowed hash algorithm) and prompts the user to accept or deny the key before continuing the



connection.

Test 2: The evaluator will add an entry associating a host name with a public key into the TOE's local database. The evaluator will replace, on the corresponding SSH server, the server's host key with a different host key. The evaluator will initiate a connection from the TOE to the SSH server using password-based authentication, shall ensure that the TOE rejects the connection, and shall ensure that the password was not transmitted to the SSH server (for example, by instrumenting the SSH server with a debugging capability to output received passwords).

### **Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: The evaluator deleted all the TOE's server host keys and then attempted to connect to a remote SSH server. The server displays the SSH server host key and prompts the client to accept or deny the key before continuing the connection.

Test 2: The evaluator replaced the current host key on a remote SSH server by generating a new key pair and then attempted to connect to the server from the TOE. The client is presented with a warning from the server that the host key has changed, and the verification fails before any passwords can be sent.

## **6.2.2 FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1 SSH Protocol – Server**

### **6.2.2.1 TSS Assurance Activity**

#### **FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.1**

The evaluator will check to ensure that the TSS contains a description of the public key algorithms that are acceptable for use for authentication, that this list conforms to FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.4, and ensure that password-based authentication methods, if supported, are described.

#### **FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.2**

The evaluator will check that the TSS describes how "large packets" in terms of RFC 4253 are detected and handled.

#### **FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.3**

The evaluator will check the description of the implementation of this protocol in the TSS to ensure that optional characteristics are specified, and the encryption algorithms supported are specified as well. The evaluator will check the TSS to ensure that the encryption algorithms specified are identical to those listed for this component.

#### **FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.4**

The evaluator will check the description of the implementation of this protocol in the TSS to ensure that optional characteristics are specified, and the public key algorithms supported are specified as well. The evaluator will check the TSS to ensure that the public key algorithms specified are identical to those listed for this component.

#### **FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.5**

The evaluator will check the TSS to ensure that it lists the supported data integrity algorithms, and that that list corresponds to the list in this component.

#### **FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.6**

The evaluator will check the TSS to ensure that it lists the supported key exchange algorithms, and that that list corresponds to the list in this component.

#### **FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.7**

None defined.

### **Evaluator Assessment:**

#### **FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.1**

The evaluator verified that the TSS identifies that the SSH-RSA algorithm is used for authentication. This list is consistent with the



selections made in FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.4. Password-based authentication is supported by the OS.

#### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.2

Packets that exceed 262144 bytes are dropped at the application layer per RFC 4253. When an SSH packet is received, the packet length field is inspected. If the packet length is larger than the specified limit, the packet is dropped, and the connection is terminated.

#### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.3

Optional characteristics are not supported by the OS. The evaluator verified that for this requirement, the encryption algorithms selected are identical to those listed in the TSS. The supported encryption algorithms are AES128-CTR, AES256-CTR, AES128-CBC, and AES256-CBC.

#### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.4

Optional characteristics are not supported by the OS. The evaluator verified that for this requirement, the public key algorithms selected are identical to those listed in the TSS. The supported public key algorithm is SSH-RSA.

#### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.5

The TSS lists the following data integrity MAC algorithms: HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA2-256, and HMAC-SHA2-512. This list is identical to those listed for this component.

#### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.6

The TSS lists the following key exchange algorithm: diffie-hellman-group14-sha1. This is identical to what is listed for this component.

### 6.2.2.2 Guidance Documentation Assurance Activity

#### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.3

The evaluator will also check the guidance documentation to ensure that it contains instructions on configuring the TOE so that SSH conforms to the description in the TSS (for instance, the set of algorithms advertised by the TOE may have to be restricted to meet the requirements).

#### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.4

The evaluator will also check the guidance documentation to ensure that it contains instructions on configuring the TOE so that SSH conforms to the description in the TSS (for instance, the set of algorithms advertised by the TOE may have to be restricted to meet the requirements).

#### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.5

The evaluator will also check the guidance documentation to ensure that it contains instructions to the administrator on how to ensure that only the allowed data integrity algorithms are used in SSH connections with the TOE (specifically, that the "none" MAC algorithm is not allowed).

#### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.6

The evaluator will also check the guidance documentation to ensure that it contains instructions to the administrator on how to ensure that only the allowed key exchange algorithms are used in SSH connections to the TOE.

#### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.7

None defined.

### Evaluator Assessment:

#### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.3

Section 5 of the [AGD] provides instructions on configuring the TOE such that it conforms to the description in the TSS.



#### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.4

Section 5 of the [AGD] provides instructions on configuring the TOE such that it conforms to the description in the TSS.

#### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.5

Section 5.1 of the [AGD] provides instructions that would allow the administrator to ensure only allowed data integrity algorithms are used in SSH connections with the TOE.

#### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.6

Section 5.1 of the [AGD] provides instructions that would allow the administrator to ensure only allowed key exchange algorithms are used in SSH connections with the TOE.

### 6.2.2.3 Test Assurance Activity

#### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.1

Test 1: The evaluator will, for each public key algorithm supported, show that the TOE supports the use of that public key algorithm to authenticate a user connection from an SSH client. Any configuration activities required to support this test shall be performed according to instructions in the guidance documentation.

Test 2: The evaluator shall choose one public key algorithm supported by the TOE. The evaluator shall generate a new key pair for that algorithm without configuring the TOE to recognize the public key for authentication. The evaluator shall use an SSH client to attempt to connect to the TOE with the new key pair and demonstrate that authentication fails.

Test 3 [conditional]: Using the guidance documentation, the evaluator will configure the TOE to perform password-based authentication on a client, and demonstrate that a user can be successfully authenticated by the TOE using a password as an authenticator.

Test 4 [conditional]: The evaluator shall use an SSH client, enter an incorrect password to attempt to authenticate to the TOE, and demonstrate that the authentication fails.

#### Evaluator Assessment:

Test 1: The evaluator configured the TOE to use the available public key algorithms and attempted to authenticate to the server. The connection was successful.

Test 2: The evaluator generated a new keypair and then attempted to authenticate to the TOE with the new key pair. The connection was refused by the TOE.

Test 3: The evaluator attempted to authenticate to the TOE using a valid username and password and verified that the authentication was successful.

Test 4: The evaluator attempted to authenticate to the TOE using an invalid username and password and verified that the authentication failed.

#### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.2

The evaluator will demonstrate that if the TOE receives a packet larger than that specified in this component, that packet is dropped.

#### Evaluator Assessment:

The evaluator made a successful connection to the TOE and then sent a packet larger than specified allowed size. The evaluator verified that the connection was terminated after receiving the packet.

#### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.3

Test 1: The evaluator will initiate an SSH connection using each of the encryption algorithms specified by the requirement. It is





sufficient to observe (on the wire) the successful negotiation of the algorithm to satisfy the intent of the test.

Test 2: The evaluator will configure an SSH client to only propose the 3des-cbc encryption algorithm and no other encryption algorithms. The evaluator will attempt to establish an SSH connection from the client to the TOE server and observe that the connection is rejected.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: The evaluator attempted to initiate an SSH connection using each of the encryption algorithms specified and verified the connections were successful.

Test 2: The evaluator attempted to establish an SSH connection to a remote server with the client configured to only propose the 3des-cbc encryption algorithm. The connection was rejected.

---

**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.4**

Test 1: Using an appropriately configured client, the evaluator will establish an SSH connection using each of the public key algorithms specified by the requirement to authenticate. It is sufficient to observe (on the wire) the successful negotiation of the algorithm to satisfy the intent of the test.

Test 2: The evaluator will configure an SSH client to propose only the ssh-dsa public key algorithm and no other public key algorithms. Using this client, the evaluator will attempt to establish an SSH connection to the TOE and observe that the connection is rejected.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: The evaluator verified that an SSH connection to TOE can be made using the specified public key algorithm.

Test 2: The evaluator attempted to connect to the TOE using the ssh-dsa public key algorithm and verified that the TOE rejects the connection.

---

**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.5**

Test 1: Using an appropriately configured client, the evaluator will establish a SSH connection using each of the integrity algorithms specified by the requirement. It is sufficient to observe (on the wire) the successful negotiation of the algorithm to satisfy the intent of the test.

Test 2: The evaluator will configure an SSH client to only propose the "none" MAC algorithm. Using this client, the evaluator will attempt to connect to the TOE and observe that the attempt fails.

Test 3: The evaluator will configure an SSH client to only propose the hmac-md5 MAC algorithm. Using this client, the evaluator will attempt to connect to the TOE and observe that the attempt fails.

---

**Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: The evaluator verified that an SSH connection can be made using the specified integrity algorithms.

Test 2: The evaluator configured an SSH client to only propose connections using the "none" MAC algorithm. The connection to the TOE was refused.

Test 3: The evaluator configured an SSH client to only propose connections using the hmac-md5 MAC algorithm. The connection to the TOE was refused.

---

**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.6**

Test 1: For each of the allowed key exchange methods, the evaluator will configure an SSH client to propose only it and attempt to



connect to the TOE and observe that each attempt succeeds.

Test 2: The evaluator shall configure an SSH client to only allow the diffiehellman-group1-sha1 key exchange. The evaluator shall attempt to connect from the SSH client to the SSH Server and observe that the attempt fails.

**Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: The evaluator configured an SSH client to propose each of the allowed key exchange methods and verified that a successful connection could be made to the TOE using each one.

Test 2: The evaluator configured an SSH client to only allow the diffiehellman-group1-sha1 key exchange and verified that a connection to the TOE fails.

**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.7**

Test 1: The evaluator will configure the TOE to create a log entry when a rekey occurs. The evaluator will connect to the TOE with an SSH client and cause a rekey to occur according to the selection(s) in the ST, and subsequently the evaluator uses available methods and tools to verify that rekeying occurs. This could be done, e.g., by checking that a corresponding audit event has been generated by the TOE, if the TOE supports auditing of rekey events.

**Evaluator Assessment:**

Test 1: The evaluator configured the TOE to create a log entry when a rekey occurs. A successful SSH connection was then made from the client to the TOE. The evaluator verified by checking the audit log that the rekey occurs before the specified limit stated in the ST.