



## Best Current Practice

OCSBC – 9.2 to 9.3 IPsec upgrade

Category: Informational

March 2025, Version 1.00

### Revision History

Version	Author	Description of Changes	Date Revision Completed
0.00	Matej Maric	Initial version	11.3.2025
1.00	Matej Maric	Ikev2 and responder role tested	29.4.2025



## Abstract

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

The configurations provided in this document SHOULD NOT be treated as RECOMMENDED. The information is intended to provide guidance as to the OCSBC behavior when configurations listed in this document are applied.

This document is intended to provide the reader with information regarding configuration of an OCSBC to provide user authentication via several RADIUS servers.

## Applicability

The details provided are relevant to physical & virtual Oracle Communications Session Border Controller (OCSBC) instances before upgrade to 9.3. Document will detail the best approach to migrate to 9.3 for customers having multiple IPsec tunnels in prior versions, negotiated with 9.3 deprecated ciphers. Instructions are valid for ikev1 and ikev2 with PSK in use.



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## Changes introduced with 9.3 impacting IPsec functionality

The S-Cz9.3.0 SBC release includes a Mocana version upgrade that generates important changes to the ciphers you should use with the SBC. The latest Mocana 7.0 software code disables weak ciphers/algorithms used by IKE-based IPsec tunnels. Removal of these weak ciphers is mandated by Oracle Security standards. If in use, you should consider replacing deprecated ciphers in your configuration. Changes introduced have impact on both, IKE secure exchange protocol method and IPsec SA authentication and encryption algorithms.

- Concerning IKE exchange, dh-group2(mod1024) is removed from the supported list of DH groups



- Concerning IPsec SA authentication, sha1 and md5 are removed from auth-alg list
- Concerning IPsec SA encryption, 3des and null are removed from encryption-alg list

## IPsec generic introduction

**IPsec (Internet Protocol Security)** is a suite of protocols used to secure network communications by authenticating and encrypting IP packets. It relies on the **IKE (Internet Key Exchange)** protocol to establish security associations (SAs) between peers.

### IPsec IKEv1 vs IKEv2 Comparison

Feature	IKEv1	IKEv2
<b>Introduced</b>	1998 (RFC 2409)	2005 (RFC 4306, updated in RFC 7296)
<b>Phases</b>	Two phases: Phase 1 (Main/Aggressive Mode) and Phase 2 (Quick Mode)	Single phase, simplifying the exchange process
<b>Performance</b>	More overhead, slower negotiation	Faster, more efficient
<b>Reliability</b>	Limited support for NAT traversal, less efficient failure handling	Built-in NAT traversal, better resilience and failover
<b>Mobility</b>	No built-in support for mobility	Supports MOBIKE for better mobile client support
<b>Flexibility</b>	More complex, less adaptable	More robust and adaptable to modern networks
<b>Security</b>	More vulnerable to DoS attacks, lacks built-in anti-replay protection	Stronger security, includes anti-replay protection and improved authentication

#### Conclusion:

IKEv2 is a significant improvement over IKEv1 in terms of security, performance, and efficiency. It is the preferred choice for modern IPsec VPN implementations.

## IKEv1 Message Exchange

## IKEv1 Phase 1 (Main Mode)

Initiator	Message	Responder
Initiator	SA Proposal -->	
	<-- SA Proposal Accepted	Responder
Initiator	Key Exchange -->	
	<-- Key Exchange	Responder
Initiator	Authentication -->	
	<-- Authentication	Responder
	(Secure tunnel established for Phase 2)	

## IKEv1 Phase 2 (Quick Mode)

Initiator	Message	Responder
Initiator	SA Negotiation -->	
	<-- SA Negotiation Response	Responder
Initiator	Key Exchange -->	
	<-- Key Exchange	Responder
Initiator	Authentication -->	
	<-- Authentication	Responder
	(IPsec tunnel established)	

Phase 1: Establishes a secure, authenticated channel between peers (ISAKMP SA).

Phase 2: Negotiates IPsec SAs for encrypting traffic.

### IKEv2 Message Exchange

Initiator	Message	Responder	Description
Initiator	IKE_SA_INIT Request -->		Initiator proposes cryptographic algorithms and sends key material
	<-- IKE_SA_INIT Response	Responder	Responder agrees on algorithms and responds with key material
Initiator	IKE_AUTH Request -->		Initiator authenticates and sends identity information
	<-- IKE_AUTH Response	Responder	Responder authenticates and sends identity information
	(IKE SA established)		Secure tunnel established for child SA setup
Initiator	CREATE_CHILD_SA Request -->		Negotiation of additional child SA parameters
	<-- CREATE_CHILD_SA Response	Responder	Agreement on child SA parameters
	(IPsec tunnel established)		Secure IPsec tunnel setup

## Software


Software SBC - SCZ920.p6

Software OCOM – 6.0

## Problem statement and challenges

Focus of this BCP is on how to prepare SBC running in version lower than 9.3 for as less affecting 9.3 upgrade with minimal service disruption. SBC handling multiple tunnels that were set up at point of time and need sudden reconfiguration are a challenge for several reasons, main being one that customer cannot manage some global SBC changes without affecting all the tunnels and gathering different group of people responsible for remote tunnel end becomes mission impossible. This BCP should provide guidance on best steps to take for this migration but outcome also gives an idea of what SBC blueprint configuration might be that may make future maintenance easier.

## LAB IPsec testing topology





## Disclaimer on test coverage

Testing scope of this BCP includes ONLY DH groups and authentication and encryption algorithms outlined in this document. Any other combination should be thoroughly tested in lab premises following same procedure before any live activities.

## SBC IPsec configuration objects

### SBC in SP infrastructure

This is the SBC that needs to move to 9.3 and has both remote tunnels negotiated using 9.3 deprecated IKE DH phase1 group mod1024 (dh-group2). In addition, one remote peer has fixated but 9.3 deprecated IPsec SA encryption and authentication algorithm. Let us list the relevant configuration parts

```

SP_SBC# sho configuration ike-config
ike-config
  state                enabled
  ike-version          1
  log-level            INFO
  udp-port             500
  negotiation-timeout  15
  event-timeout        60
  phase1-mode          main
  phase1-dh-mode       dh-group2
  phase2-exchange-mode dh-group2
  v2-ike-life-secs     86400
  v2-ipsec-life-secs   28800
  v2-rekey             enabled
  anti-replay          enabled
  phase1-life-seconds  3600
  phase1-life-secs-max 86400
  phase2-life-seconds  28800
  phase2-life-secs-max 86400
  shared-password      *****
  eap-protocol         eap-radius-passthru
  eap-bypass-identity  disabled
  red-port             0
  red-max-trans        10000

```

## Best current practice



```
red-sync-start-time      5000
red-sync-comp-time       1000
dpd-time-interval        0
overload-threshold       100
overload-interval        1
overload-action          none
overload-critical-threshold 100
overload-critical-interval 1
sd-authentication-method shared-password
certificate-profile-id
id-auth-type             idi
options
last-modified-by        admin@10.0.15.149
last-modified-date      2025-03-11 08:56:00
ikev2-ipsec-wancom0-params
```

SP\_SBC# sho configuration ike-interface

```
ike-interface
state          enabled
ike-version    1
address        10.0.17.40
realm-id      Core
ike-mode       initiator
dpd-params-name
v2-ike-life-secs      86400
v2-ipsec-life-secs    28800
v2-rekey             none
v1-ike-life-secs     3600
v1-ipsec-life-secs   28800
esnSupport           disabled
shared-password      *****
eap-protocol
sd-authentication-method shared-password
certificate-profile-id-list
cert-status-check    disabled
cert-status-profile-list
access-control-name
tunnel-orig-name-list
options
last-modified-by    admin@10.0.15.149
last-modified-date  2025-03-10 13:27:19
ike-interface
state              enabled
```

## Best current practice



```
ike-version          1
address             10.0.17.41
realm-id            Core1
ike-mode            initiator
dpd-params-name
v2-ike-life-secs    86400
v2-ipsec-life-secs  28800
v2-rekey            none
v1-ike-life-secs    3600
v1-ipsec-life-secs  28800
esnSupport          disabled
shared-password     *****
eap-protocol
sd-authentication-method  shared-password
certificate-profile-id-list
cert-status-check   disabled
cert-status-profile-list
access-control-name
tunnel-orig-name-list
options
last-modified-by    admin@10.0.15.149
last-modified-date  2025-03-11 08:45:47
```

SP\_SBC# sho configuration ike-sainfo

```
ike-sainfo
  name          customer2
  security-protocol  esp-auth
  auth-algo     sha1
  encryption-algo  3des
  ipsec-mode    tunnel
  tunnel-local-addr  10.0.17.41
  tunnel-remote-addr 10.0.17.19
  last-modified-by  admin@10.0.15.149
  last-modified-date 2025-03-11 08:44:25
```

```
ike-sainfo
  name          ipsec
  security-protocol  esp-auth
  auth-algo     sha2-512
  encryption-algo  aes-ctr
  ipsec-mode    tunnel
  tunnel-local-addr 10.0.17.40
  tunnel-remote-addr 10.0.17.19
  last-modified-by  admin@10.0.15.149
  last-modified-date 2025-03-10 21:04:47
```

## Best current practice



```
SP_SBC# sho configuration security-policy short
security-policy
```

```
  name                pol1
  network-interface    S1P0:0.4
  local-ip-addr-match  10.0.17.40
  remote-ip-addr-match 10.0.17.19
  local-port-match     500
  local-port-match-max 4500
  remote-port-match    500
  remote-port-match-max 4500
  action               allow
```

```
security-policy
```

```
  name                pol2
  network-interface    S1P0:0.4
  priority             2
  local-ip-addr-match  10.0.17.40
  remote-ip-addr-match 10.0.17.19
  ike-sainfo-name      ipsec
```

```
security-policy
```

```
  name                pol33
  network-interface    S1P0:0.4
  priority             1
  local-ip-addr-match  10.0.17.41
  remote-ip-addr-match 10.0.17.19
  local-port-match     500
  local-port-match-max 4500
  remote-port-match    500
  remote-port-match-max 4500
  action               allow
```

```
security-policy
```

```
  name                pol35
  network-interface    S1P0:0.4
  priority             5
  local-ip-addr-match  10.0.17.41
  remote-ip-addr-match 10.0.17.19
  ike-sainfo-name      customer2
```

**Note down the relevant parts bolded and highlighted yellow! All these are deprecated in 9.3 and blind upgrade would lead to all IPsec tunnels down!**

## Remote SBC in customer1 infrastructure

```

ike-config
  state                enabled
  ike-version          1
  log-level            INFO
  udp-port             500
  negotiation-timeout 15
  event-timeout        60
  phase1-mode          main
  phase1-dh-mode       dh-group2
  phase2-exchange-mode dh-group2
  v2-ike-life-secs    86400
  v2-ipsec-life-secs  28800
  v2-rekey             enabled
  anti-replay          enabled
  phase1-life-seconds 3600
  phase1-life-secs-max 86400
  phase2-life-seconds 28800
  phase2-life-secs-max 86400
  shared-password     *****
  eap-protocol         eap-radius-passthru
  eap-bypass-identity disabled
  red-port             0
  red-max-trans        10000
  red-sync-start-time 5000
  red-sync-comp-time  1000
  dpd-time-interval   0
  overload-threshold  100
  overload-interval   1
  overload-action      none
  overload-critical-threshold 100
  overload-critical-interval 1
  sd-authentication-method shared-password
  certificate-profile-id
  id-auth-type        idi
  options
  last-modified-by    admin@10.0.15.149
  last-modified-date  2025-03-10 20:33:50
customer1# sho configuration ike-interface
ike-interface
  state                enabled

```

## Best current practice



```
ike-version          1
address              10.0.17.19
realm-id             CoreAS
ike-mode              responder
dpd-params-name
v2-ike-life-secs     86400
v2-ipsec-life-secs   28800
v2-rekey              none
v1-ike-life-secs     3600
v1-ipsec-life-secs   28800
esnSupport            disabled
shared-password      *****
eap-protocol
sd-authentication-method  shared-password
certificate-profile-id-list
cert-status-check    disabled
cert-status-profile-list
access-control-name
tunnel-orig-name-list
options
last-modified-by     admin@10.0.15.149
last-modified-date   2025-03-10 13:24:11
```

customer1# sho configuration ike-sainfo

```
ike-sainfo
  name                customer1
  security-protocol   esp-auth
  auth-algo            sha2-512
  encryption-algo     aes-ctr
  ipsec-mode           tunnel
  tunnel-local-addr   10.0.17.19
  tunnel-remote-addr  10.0.17.40
  last-modified-by    admin@10.0.15.149
  last-modified-date  2025-03-10 21:05:52
```

customer1# sho configuration security-policy short

```
security-policy
  name                pol1
  network-interface    S1P0:0.4
  local-ip-addr-match  10.0.17.19
  remote-ip-addr-match 10.0.17.40
  local-port-match     500
  local-port-match-max 4500
  remote-port-match    500
  remote-port-match-max 4500
```

## Best current practice



```
action          allow
security-policy
name            pol2
network-interface S1P0:0.4
priority        2
local-ip-addr-match 10.0.17.19
remote-ip-addr-match 10.0.17.40
ike-sainfo-name  customer1
```

To be noted here what is bolded and highlighted yellow at remote peer, in same time deprecated in 9.3 release. At this remote peer, only problematic part is IKE phase1 DH group selection.

## Remote SBC in customer2 infrastructure

```
ike-config
state          enabled
ike-version    1
log-level      INFO
udp-port       500
negotiation-timeout 15
event-timeout  60
phase1-mode    main
phase1-dh-mode    dh-group2
phase2-exchange-mode dh-group2
v2-ike-life-secs 86400
v2-ipsec-life-secs 28800
v2-rekey        enabled
anti-replay     enabled
phase1-life-seconds 3600
phase1-life-secs-max 86400
phase2-life-seconds 28800
phase2-life-secs-max 86400
shared-password *****
eap-protocol    eap-radius-passthru
```

## Best current practice



```
eap-bypass-identity      disabled
red-port                 0
red-max-trans            10000
red-sync-start-time      5000
red-sync-comp-time       1000
dpd-time-interval        0
overload-threshold       100
overload-interval        1
overload-action          none
overload-critical-threshold 100
overload-critical-interval 1
sd-authentication-method shared-password
certificate-profile-id
id-auth-type             idi
options
last-modified-by        admin@10.0.15.149
last-modified-date      2025-03-10 20:33:50
```

customer2# sho configuration ike-interface

ike-interface

```
state                    enabled
ike-version              1
address                  10.0.17.19
realm-id                 CoreAS
ike-mode                  responder
dpd-params-name
v2-ike-life-secs        86400
v2-ipsec-life-secs      28800
v2-rekey                 none
v1-ike-life-secs        3600
v1-ipsec-life-secs      28800
esnSupport               disabled
shared-password          *****
eap-protocol
sd-authentication-method shared-password
certificate-profile-id-list
cert-status-check       disabled
cert-status-profile-list
access-control-name
tunnel-orig-name-list
options
last-modified-by        admin@10.0.15.149
last-modified-date      2025-03-10 13:24:11
```

customer2# sho configuration ike-sainfo

## Best current practice



```
ike-sainfo
  name                customer2
  security-protocol    esp-auth
  auth-algo            sha1
  encryption-algo      3des
  ipsec-mode           tunnel
  tunnel-local-addr    10.0.17.19
  tunnel-remote-addr   10.0.17.41
  last-modified-by     admin@10.0.15.149
  last-modified-date   2025-03-11 08:36:27
customer2# sho configuration security-policy short
security-policy
  name                pol23
  network-interface    S1P0:0.4
  priority             1
  local-ip-addr-match 10.0.17.19
  remote-ip-addr-match 10.0.17.41
  local-port-match     500
  local-port-match-max 4500
  remote-port-match-max 4500
  action               allow
security-policy
  name                pol34
  network-interface    S1P0:0.4
  priority             5
  local-ip-addr-match 10.0.17.19
  remote-ip-addr-match 10.0.17.41
  ike-sainfo-name      customer2
```

To be noted what is highlighted yellow and bolded, in same time deprecated in SBC release 9.3. At customer2, we have problem with IKE phase1 dh-group selection, but also encryption and authentication IPSEC SA algorithms.

## Remote SBC in customerN infrastructure

In certain cases SP SBC may act as IP sec tunnel responder for a tunnel in which case same steps up to now apply.



## Guidance to tackle the problem

What should be clearly outlined here is that we should get every tunnel in 9.2 up and running with dh-group and IPsec SA ciphers supported in 9.3. Upgrade should be attempted only and only then if we aim for minimal service disruption. We will follow here how to get there in couple of iterations.

### DH group selection

Idea in step 1 is to get the most flexible SBC configuration in place when it comes to IKE dh-group selection. As we have seen, this selection will be specified in global element ike-config and current SP settings are fixating dh-group2 for phase1 and phase2 exchange. With such settings, initiating a tunnel with ikev1 or ikev2 SBC would start the tunnel negotiation offering proposal that consist of dh-group2 transforms only.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
641	186.045360	10.0.17.40	10.0.17.19	ISAKMP	930	Identity Protection (Main M...
642	186.045367	10.0.17.41	10.0.17.19	ISAKMP	930	Identity Protection (Main M...
643	186.045697	10.0.17.19	10.0.17.40	ISAKMP	166	Identity Protection (Main M...
644	186.045735	10.0.17.19	10.0.17.41	ISAKMP	166	Identity Protection (Main M...
645	186.048462	10.0.17.40	10.0.17.19	ISAKMP	358	Identity Protection (Main M...

```

> Payload: Transform (3) # 12
> Payload: Transform (3) # 13
> Payload: Transform (3) # 14
> Payload: Transform (3) # 15
> Payload: Transform (3) # 16
> Payload: Transform (3) # 17
< Payload: Transform (3) # 18
  Next payload: Transform (3)
  Reserved: 00
  Payload length: 36
  Transform number: 18
  Transform ID: KEY_IKE (1)
  Reserved: 0000
  > IKE Attribute (t=3,l=2): Authentication-Method: Pre-shared key
  < IKE Attribute (t=4,l=2): Group-Description: Alternate 1024-bit MODP group
  > IKE Attribute (t=2,l=2): Hash-Algorithm: MD5
  > IKE Attribute (t=1,l=2): Encryption-Algorithm: AES-CBC
  > IKE Attribute (t=11,l=2): Life-Type: Seconds
  > IKE Attribute (t=12,l=2): Life-Duration: 3600
  
```

Wireshark uncovers in this case in total 18 transforms, each assuming deprecated phase1 sh-group mod1024(dh-group2).

Way around being bound to dh-group2 are following changes to global ike-config:

```

SP_SBC# sho configuration ike-config
ike-config
state enabled
  
```

## Best current practice



ike-version	1
log-level	INFO
udp-port	500
negotiation-timeout	15
event-timeout	60
phase1-mode	main
phase1-dh-mode	dh-group2 → change to "first-supported"
phase2-exchange-mode	dh-group2 → change to "same-as-phase1"
v2-ike-life-secs	86400
v2-ipsec-life-secs	28800
v2-rekey	enabled
anti-replay	enabled

This change requires SBC reboot in maintenance window. For HA deployments however service will not be affected, exact steps to follow for HA:

1. Change ike-config as previously outlined.
2. Save/activate config.
3. Switchover: notify berpd force (We are not bringing down the tunnel).
4. Reboot standby.
5. Once it comes up, again switchover.
6. Reboot now old active (now standby). Tunnels will remain up.
7. Once this node is also up, tear down tunnel.
8. New tunnel now will be established with "first-supported". Typically, it will be OPTIONS ping or any other traffic through the tunnel bringing it up.

When it comes to operation "tearing down" the tunnel following command is to be used:

```
security ipsec delete tunnel destIP [remote IPsec peer IP] spi [outbound SPI]
```

Capturing traffic after steps above we should see that SBC initiating a tunnel extends its proposal with transforms that include all dh-groups supported:



No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1481	340.515058	10.0.17.40	10.0.17.19	ISAKMP	350	Quick Mode
1482	340.520102	10.0.17.19	10.0.17.40	ISAKMP	374	Quick Mode
1483	340.522925	10.0.17.40	10.0.17.19	ISAKMP	150	Quick Mode
3321	791.433395	10.0.17.40	10.0.17.19	ISAKMP	1514	Identity Protection (Main M...
3322	791.435114	10.0.17.19	10.0.17.40	ISAKMP	166	Identity Protection (Main M...
3323	791.440612	10.0.17.40	10.0.17.19	ISAKMP	486	Identity Protection (Main M...
3324	791.451796	10.0.17.19	10.0.17.40	ISAKMP	486	Identity Protection (Main M...
3325	791.460067	10.0.17.40	10.0.17.19	ISAKMP	150	Identity Protection (Main M...
3326	791.462121	10.0.17.19	10.0.17.40	ISAKMP	150	Identity Protection (Main M...
3327	791.462149	10.0.17.19	10.0.17.40	ISAKMP	166	Informational
3329	791.466775	10.0.17.40	10.0.17.19	ISAKMP	478	Quick Mode

```

> Payload: Transform (3) # 19
< Payload: Transform (3) # 20
  Next payload: Transform (3)
  Reserved: 00
  Payload length: 32
  Transform number: 20
  Transform ID: KEY_IKE (1)
  Reserved: 0000
  > IKE Attribute (t=3,l=2): Authentication-Method: Pre-shared key
  > IKE Attribute (t=4,l=2): Group-Description: 2048 bit MODP group
  > IKE Attribute (t=2,l=2): Hash-Algorithm: MD5
  > IKE Attribute (t=1,l=2): Encryption-Algorithm: 3DES-CBC
  > IKE Attribute (t=11,l=2): Life-Type: Seconds
  > IKE Attribute (t=12,l=2): Life-Duration: 3600
  
```

```

00a0 80 0e 00 80 03 00 00 20 04 01
00b0 80 04 00 0e 80 02 00 06 80 01
00c0 80 0c 0e 10 03 00 00 24 05 01
00d0 80 04 00 0e 80 02 00 05 80 01
00e0 80 0c 0e 10 80 0e 01 00 03 00
00f0 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e 80 02
0100 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 0e
0110 07 01 00 00 80 03 00 01 80 04
0120 80 01 00 07 80 0b 00 01 80 0c
0130 03 00 00 20 08 01 00 00 80 03
0140 80 02 00 05 80 01 00 05 80 0b
0150 03 00 00 24 09 01 00 00 80 03
0160 80 02 00 04 80 01 00 07 80 0b
0170 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 24 0a 01
0180 80 04 00 0e 80 02 00 04 80 01
  
```

Already by the message size, it is obvious that new proposal is larger and this time it consists of 80 possible transforms involving all dh-groups supported.

Goal of this exercise was ONLY and ONLY to get flexibility in SBC to negotiate dh-groups supported in 9.3 release. Real outcome in reality will be the same tunnels built up again, just this time based on remote peer dh-group preference. As of this point customer may set up working sessions with remote peer-by-peer approach tuning the remaining tunnel parameters.

### Customer1 working session

At the scheduled working appointment (maintenance window) with remote peer, SP should request dh-group preference change to the dh-group version that will be supported in 9.3(dh-group14 in example). Once remote peer confirms the change SP should tear down the tunnel and bring it back up (real traffic, OPTIONS ping, ICMP)

To identify the tunnel to be torn down following procedure is to be used:

```
sho security ipsec sad S1P0 detail
```

```
Inbound SPI: 11313131
      source-address           : 10.0.17.19
```



```

destination-address      : 10.0.17.40
vlan_id                  : 0
ipsec-protocol           : ESP
encr-algo                : aes-256-ctr
auth-algo                : hmac-sha-512
sa-installation-time     : 2025-03-11 13:09:53.138
sa-duration              : 77042
sa-installation-complete : 0
sa-installed-on-active   : 0
tunnel-source            : 10.0.17.40
tunnel-destination       : 10.0.17.19
match fields:
    src-ip                : 10.0.17.19
    dst-ip                 : 10.0.17.40
    src-port               : 0
    dst-port               : 0
    trans-proto            : any
mask_fields:
    src-ip                : 255.255.255.255
    dst-ip                 : 255.255.255.255
    src-port               : 0
    dst-port               : 0
    vlan-id                : 0xFFF
    protocol               : ALL
byte count limit -
    hard ms: 0xFFFFFFFF, hard ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
    soft ms: 0xFFFFFFFF, soft ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
hard limit -
    hard ms: 0x          0, hard ls : 0xFFFFFFFF
    soft ms: 0x          0, soft ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
    packets: 0x          8

```

**Outbound SPI: 2655227280**

**Mirror SPI : 11313131**

```

source-address          : 10.0.17.40
destination-address     : 10.0.17.19
source-port              : 0
destination-port         : 0
trans-proto              : any
vlan_id                  : 0
ipsec-protocol           : ESP
encr-algo                : aes-256-ctr
auth-algo                : hmac-sha-512
sa-installation-time     : 2025-03-11 13:09:53.138
sa-duration              : 77043
sa-installation-complete : 0
sa-installed-on-active   : 0
tunnel-source            : 10.0.17.40
tunnel-destination       : 10.0.17.19
byte count limit -
    hard ms: 0xFFFFFFFF, hard ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
    soft ms: 0xFFFFFFFF, soft ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
time limit -

```

## Best current practice



```
hard ms: 0x          0, hard ls : 0xFFFFFFFF
soft ms: 0x          0, soft ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
sequence number -
ms: 0x              0, ls: 0x          8
packets -
0x                  8
```

Once outbound SPI is identified, we can tear down the tunnel. Remark that only issue to be fixed with customer1 is to get proper dh-group selection. Given the SBC is now offering full transform list and remote peer has confirmed upgrade to 9.3 supported group only thing that remains is tunnel down/up. This can be done from CLI with:

```
security ipsec delete tunnel destIP 10.0.17.19 spi 2655227280
```

Both tunnel ends in this setup are SIP OPTIONS monitored and tunnel quickly goes up gain this time with dh-group14(mod2048) used.

```
Outbound SPI: 2334756330
```

```
Mirror SPI : 1288286270
```

```
source-address      : 10.0.17.40
destination-address : 10.0.17.19
source-port         : 0
destination-port    : 0
trans-proto        : any
vlan_id            : 0
ipsec-protocol     : ESP
encr-algo          : aes-256-ctr
auth-algo          : hmac-sha-512
sa-installation-time : 2025-03-11 13:19:33.975
sa-duration        : 4285
sa-installation-complete : 0
sa-installed-on-active : 0
tunnel-source      : 10.0.17.40
tunnel-destination : 10.0.17.19
byte count limit -
hard ms: 0xFFFFFFFF, hard ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
soft ms: 0xFFFFFFFF, soft ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
time limit -
hard ms: 0x          0, hard ls : 0xFFFFFFFF
soft ms: 0x          0, soft ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
sequence number -
ms: 0x              0, ls: 0x          1
packets -
0x                  1
```

```
Inbound SPI: 1288286270
```

```
source-address      : 10.0.17.19
destination-address : 10.0.17.40
vlan_id            : 0
```



```

ipsec-protocol           : ESP
encr-algo                : aes-256-ctr
auth-algo                : hmac-sha-512
sa-installation-time    : 2025-03-11 13:19:33.975
sa-duration              : 4285
sa-installation-complete : 0
sa-installed-on-active  : 0
tunnel-source            : 10.0.17.40
tunnel-destination      : 10.0.17.19
match fields:
    src-ip                : 10.0.17.19
    dst-ip                : 10.0.17.40
    src-port              : 0
    dst-port              : 0
    trans-proto           : any
mask_fields:
    src-ip                : 255.255.255.255
    dst-ip                : 255.255.255.255
    src-port              : 0
    dst-port              : 0
    vlan-id               : 0xFFF
    protocol              : ALL
byte count limit -
    hard ms: 0xFFFFFFFF, hard ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
    soft ms: 0xFFFFFFFF, soft ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
hard limit -
    hard ms: 0x      0, hard ls : 0xFFFFFFFF
    soft ms: 0x      0, soft ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
    packets: 0x      1

```

Right after tunnel is up with SAs being re-build and counters freshly show just single packet (sip OPTIONS) out and single packet in(2000K for SIP OPTIONS). As of now customer1 tunnel is ready for migration to 9.3.

## Customer2 working session

At customer2 appointment to tune the tunnel parameters further, we have more things to do. With customer2, we need to get 9.3-supported dh-group to be chosen but also we need to upgrade IPsec SA encryption and authentication algorithms, as currently used ones are not supported in 9.3. We will start by identifying the customer2 security associations:

**Inbound SPI: 3821119041**

```
source-address      : 10.0.17.19
destination-address : 10.0.17.41
vlan_id            : 0
ipsec-protocol     : ESP
encr-algo          : 3des
auth-algo           : hmac-sha1
sa-installation-time : 2025-03-11 13:09:53.175
sa-duration        : 585086
sa-installation-complete : 0
sa-installed-on-active : 0
tunnel-source      : 10.0.17.41
tunnel-destination : 10.0.17.19
match fields:
    src-ip          : 10.0.17.19
    dst-ip          : 10.0.17.41
    src-port        : 0
    dst-port        : 0
    trans-proto     : any
mask_fields:
    src-ip          : 255.255.255.255
    dst-ip          : 255.255.255.255
    src-port        : 0
    dst-port        : 0
    vlan-id         : 0xFFF
    protocol        : ALL
byte count limit -
    hard ms: 0xFFFFFFFF, hard ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
    soft ms: 0xFFFFFFFF, soft ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
hard limit -
    hard ms: 0x      0, hard ls : 0xFFFFFFFF
    soft ms: 0x      0, soft ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
    packets: 0x      3B
```

**Outbound SPI: 2464010320****Mirror SPI : 3821119041**

```
source-address      : 10.0.17.41
destination-address : 10.0.17.19
source-port         : 0
destination-port    : 0
trans-proto        : any
vlan_id            : 0
ipsec-protocol     : ESP
encr-algo          : 3des
auth-algo           : hmac-sha1
sa-installation-time : 2025-03-11 13:09:53.175
sa-duration        : 585087
sa-installation-complete : 0
sa-installed-on-active : 0
tunnel-source      : 10.0.17.41
tunnel-destination : 10.0.17.19
byte count limit -
    hard ms: 0xFFFFFFFF, hard ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
```

## Best current practice



```
soft ms: 0xFFFFFFFF, soft ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
time limit -
hard ms: 0x          0, hard ls : 0xFFFFFFFF
soft ms: 0x          0, soft ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
sequence number -
ms: 0x          0, ls: 0x          3B
packets -
0x          3B
```

Relevant ike-sainfo in SP configuration is below:

```
ike-sainfo
name customer2
security-protocol esp-auth
auth-algo sha1
encryption-algo 3des
ipsec-mode tunnel
tunnel-local-addr 10.0.17.41
tunnel-remote-addr 10.0.17.19
last-modified-by admin@10.0.15.149
last-modified-date 2025-03-11 08:44:25
```

Customer2 has to confirm that on its side it has moved to dh-group supported in 9.3 (like dh-group14), also customer2 has to confirm that they adjusted encryption and authentication algorithms to those supported in SBC 9.3 software release. SP (IPsec concentrator) should swap to same ciphers on its side as well, looking in example as below:

```
ike-sainfo
name customer2
security-protocol esp-auth
auth-algo sha2-384
encryption-algo aes-ctr
ipsec-mode tunnel
tunnel-local-addr 10.0.17.41
tunnel-remote-addr 10.0.17.19
last-modified-by admin@10.0.15.149
last-modified-date 2025-03-11 08:44:25
```

Changes above take effect on tunnel down/up that we will do from CLI:

```
security ipsec delete tunnel destIP 10.0.17.19 spi 2464010320
```



Once tunnel is promptly up it can be seen that this time encryption and authentication algorithms negotiated are within the list of those supported in 9.3 SBC software release.

```
Mirror SPI : 4280153014
source-address      : 10.0.17.41
destination-address : 10.0.17.19
source-port        : 0
destination-port   : 0
trans-proto       : any
vlan_id           : 0
ipsec-protocol    : ESP
encr-algo       : aes-256-ctr
auth-algo     : hmac-sha-384
sa-installation-time : 2025-03-11 13:48:11.455
sa-duration        : 16616
sa-installation-complete : 0
sa-installed-on-active : 0
tunnel-source      : 10.0.17.41
tunnel-destination : 10.0.17.19
byte count limit -
    hard ms: 0xFFFFFFFF, hard ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
    soft ms: 0xFFFFFFFF, soft ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
time limit -
    hard ms: 0x      0, hard ls : 0xFFFFFFFF
    soft ms: 0x      0, soft ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
sequence number -
    ms: 0x      0, ls: 0x      2
packets -
    0x      2
```

```
Inbound SPI: 4280153014
source-address      : 10.0.17.19
destination-address : 10.0.17.41
vlan_id           : 0
ipsec-protocol    : ESP
encr-algo       : aes-256-ctr
auth-algo     : hmac-sha-384
sa-installation-time : 2025-03-11 13:48:11.455
sa-duration        : 16615
sa-installation-complete : 0
sa-installed-on-active : 0
tunnel-source      : 10.0.17.41
tunnel-destination : 10.0.17.19
match fields:
    src-ip        : 10.0.17.19
    dst-ip        : 10.0.17.41
    src-port      : 0
    dst-port      : 0
    trans-proto   : any
```



```
mask_fields:
    src-ip           : 255.255.255.255
    dst-ip           : 255.255.255.255
    src-port         : 0
    dst-port         : 0
    vlan-id          : 0xFFF
    protocol         : ALL
byte count limit -
    hard ms: 0xFFFFFFFF, hard ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
    soft ms: 0xFFFFFFFF, soft ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
hard limit -
    hard ms: 0x          0, hard ls : 0xFFFFFFFF
    soft ms: 0x          0, soft ls: 0xFFFFFFFF
    packets: 0x          2
```

At this point SBC is ready for customer2 tunnel regular 9.3 upgrade.

## CustomerN working session

CustomerN reference in this BCP stands for a case where SP SBC Tunnel concentrator acts for certain tunnel as a responder. Same procedure to tune the tunnel apply for such customers as for those where IPSec concentrator acts as tunnel initiator. Once tunnel details are uncovered looking into SA details remote peer should be advised in a working session that acting as responder SBC in 9.3 will not negotiate DH group 2 and deprecated encryption and authentication algorithms and that acting as initiator they should include in their offer ciphers available in 9.3

## Summary of configuration changes

1. In first phase, CSP should modify global ike-config to expose its support to all IKE dh-groups available in the given software release, check "DH group selection" chapter carefully. Change, to kick in, requires reboot.
2. In second phase, CSP should work with each remote peer to tune the tunnel settings with respect to new 9.3 requirements. This may require or may not require specific remote peer ike-sainfo configuration change. Change, to kick in, requires manual tunnel down/up operation.
3. Once tunnel parameters are modified with all remote peers SBC is ready for regular 9.3 upgrade.