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## Introduction

### *Purpose*

This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework with SPARC T4 and T5 Software Version: 1.0 and 1.1; Hardware Version: SPARC T4 (527-1437-01) and T5 (7043165) from Oracle Corporation (Oracle). This Security Policy describes how the Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework with SPARC T4 and T5 Software Version: 1.0 and 1.1; Hardware Version: SPARC T4 (527-1437-01) and T5 (7043165) meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — *Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules*) and how to run the module in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 1 FIPS 140-2 validation of the module. FIPS 140-2 details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website at <http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/>.

### *References*

This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:

- The Oracle Corporation website (<http://www.oracle.com>) contains information on the full line of products from Oracle.
- The CMVP website (<http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/>) contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.

### *Document Organization*

The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains:

- Vendor Evidence document
- Finite State Machine
- Other supporting documentation as additional references

With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Documentation is proprietary to Oracle Corporation and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Oracle Corporation.

# ORACLE SOLARIS KERNEL CRYPTOGRAPHIC FRAMEWORK WITH SPARC T4 AND T5 SOFTWARE VERSION: 1.0 AND 1.1; HARDWARE VERSION: SPARC T4 (527-1437-01) AND T5 (7043165)

## *Overview*

The Oracle Solaris 11 operating system (OS) is a highly configurable UNIX-based operating system that is optimized to quickly and securely deploy services in traditional enterprise data centers, large scale cloud environments and small personal desktop use. Oracle preserves the long-standing guarantee of binary compatibility – applications that run on previous Oracle Solaris releases can still run unchanged on Oracle Solaris 11 within the same processor architecture: x86 or SPARC<sup>1</sup>.

The Oracle Solaris 11 OS can be installed on either x86 or SPARC hardware architectures or run in a virtualized environment. The operating system allows one or more processors and multiple hardware peripheral and storage devices to be accessed by multiple users in order to meet user requirements.

Oracle Solaris 11 provides a suite of technologies and applications that create an operating system with optimal performance. Oracle Solaris 11 includes key technologies such as zones, ZFS file system, Image Packaging System (IPS), multiple boot environments, trusted extensions, and cryptographic framework.

The Oracle Solaris OS utilizes two cryptographic modules; one in the Userland space and the second in the kernel space. The OS uses the Oracle Solaris Userland Cryptographic Framework module for cryptographic functionality for any applications running in user space. It exposes PKCS#11<sup>2</sup> APIs<sup>3</sup>, uCrypto APIs, and libmd public interfaces to provide cryptography to any application designed to utilize it.

The OS also utilizes the FIPS-validated Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework module to provide cryptographic functionality for any kernel-level processes that require it, via its Oracle-proprietary APIs.

This document will focus solely on the Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework. The Oracle Solaris Userland Cryptographic Framework is discussed in another FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy.

The module meets overall level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2, and Table 1 describes the level achieved by the module in each of the eleven sections of FIPS 140-2 requirements.

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<sup>1</sup> SPARC – Scalable Processor Architecture

<sup>2</sup> PKCS #11 – Public Key Cryptography Standards #11

<sup>3</sup> API – Application Programming Interface

Section	Section Title	Level
1	Cryptographic Module Specification	1
2	Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	1
3	Roles, Services, and Authentication	1
4	Finite State Model	1
5	Physical Security	1
6	Operational Environment	1
7	Cryptographic Key Management	1
8	EMI/EMC	1
9	Self-tests	1
10	Design Assurance	1
11	Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

**Table 1 – Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section**

### ***Module Specification***

The Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework with SPARC T4 and T5 is a software-hybrid module with a multi-chip standalone embodiment. The overall security level of the module is level 1. The following sections will define the physical and logical boundaries of the module.

The cryptographic module is a group of libraries that, collectively, are known as the Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework with SPARC T4 and T5 as well as the SPARC<sup>4</sup> T4 and T5 processors, which provide cryptographic hardware acceleration. The module provides cryptographic functionality for any application that calls into it. The module provides encryption, decryption, hashing, signature generation and verification, certificate generation and verification, key generation, and message authentication functions.

Oracle produces multiple versions of the T4 processor. Oracle affirms that the FIPS module will function the same way and provide the same security services on any of the Oracle-produced T4 processors. This includes the processor in the T4-1 server, T4-1B server, and T4-2 server. This also includes the processor in the T4-4 server which is the same design but runs with a higher clock speed than the version used in T4-1 server.

Oracle also produces multiple versions of the T5 processor. Oracle affirms that the FIPS module will function the same way and provide the same security services on any of the Oracle-produced T5 processors. This includes the processors in the T5-2 server, T5-1B server, T5-4 server and the T5-8 server. This also includes the processors in the M5-32 server which has a six-core architecture and a larger memory cache.

The module makes use of the SPARC T4 and T5 processor instruction set for acceleration of cryptographic algorithms. The instruction set can only be utilized by the libraries that make up the module. The following algorithms are supported by the SPARC T4 and T5 processors:

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<sup>4</sup> SPARC – Scalable Processor Architecture












Figure 3 – T4-1 Server Hardware Block Diagram




Figure 4 – T5-2 Server Hardware Block Diagram



Figure 5 – T4 Processor




**Figure 6 – T5 Processor**

***Module Interfaces***

The module can be accessed by utilizing the API it exposes. This API is an Oracle-proprietary consumer interface. Table 2, below, shows the interfaces provided by the module.

Figure 7 and Figure 8, below, show the host appliances for the module. These diagrams show the physical ports that are available on the hardware.



**Figure 7 – T4-1 Server Front and Rear Panel Ports (SPARC T4-based)**




Figure 8 – T5-2 Server Front and Rear Ports (SPARC T5-based)

FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface	Module Logical Interface	Host Appliance Physical Interface
Data Input	Oracle-proprietary API	Ethernet, USB, SAS <sup>12</sup> port, Serial port (RJ-45), DVD optical drive
Data Output	Oracle-proprietary API	Ethernet, USB, SAS port, Serial port (RJ-45)
Control Input	Oracle-proprietary API	Ethernet, USB
Status Output	Oracle-proprietary API	Ethernet, USB, VGA port, LEDs
Power Input	Not Applicable	Power Port

Table 2 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces

### *Roles and Services*

The module relies on the host OS for authentication. There are two roles in the module (as required by FIPS 140-2) that operators may assume: a Crypto Officer role and a User role.

#### *Crypto-Officer Role*

The Crypto-Officer is any operator on the host appliance with the permissions to utilize the external cryptoadm utility, or a program with the ability to access the module APIs. The Crypto-Officer role has the ability to enable and disable FIPS

<sup>12</sup> SAS – SCSI (Small Computer System Interface) Assisted Storage

mode, check the status of the FIPS module, and configure cryptographic operations of the module, including which providers will be available. The Crypto-Officer is able to utilize these services via the cryptoadm commands. Descriptions of the services available to the Crypto-Officer role are provided in Table 3, below.

The Crypto-Officer is also able to utilize all User services, described in Table 4.

Please note that the keys and CSPs listed in the table indicate the type of access required using the following notation:

- Read: The CSP is read.
- Write: The CSP is established, generated, modified, or zeroized.
- Execute: The CSP is used within an Approved or Allowed security function or authentication mechanism

Service	Description	CSP <sup>13</sup>	Type of Access to CSP
Run POST KATs on-demand	Restarting the appliance will force the FIPS self-tests to run when the module is loaded. Calling the fips l40_post() function will call the Power-On Self-Tests.	Crypto-Officer credentials	Execute
Module Initialization	Use external cryptoadm utility to initialize the FIPS state.	Crypto-Officer credentials	Execute
Module Configuration	Use external cryptoadm utility to configure the module.	Crypto-Officer credentials	Execute
Zeroize keys	Format operation on the host appliance's hard drive	Crypto-Officer credentials	Execute

**Table 3 – Crypto-Officer Services**

The credentials for the Crypto-Officer are not considered CSPs, as requirements for module authentication are not enforced for Level 1 validation. The credentials are provided to the host OS, and are not part of the module.

#### *User Role*

The User role is able to utilize the cryptographic operations of the module, through its API. Descriptions of the services available to the User role are provided in Table 4, below.

Service	Description	CSP	Type of Access to CSP
Symmetric encryption	Encrypt a block of data using a symmetric algorithm	AES key Triple DES key	Execute
Symmetric decryption	Decrypt a block of data using a symmetric algorithm	AES key Triple DES key	Execute
Asymmetric key	Encrypt a block of data using an	RSA public key	Execute

<sup>13</sup> CSP – Critical Security Parameter

Service	Description	CSP	Type of Access to CSP
wrapping	asymmetric algorithm		
Asymmetric key unwrapping	Decrypt a block of data using an asymmetric algorithm	RSA private key	Execute
Signature Generation	Generate a signature	RSA public key	Execute
Signature Verification	Verify a signature	RSA private key	Execute
Hashing	Perform a hashing operation on a block of data, using SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512	N/A	N/A
HMAC <sup>14</sup> signing	Perform a hashing operation on a block of data, using a keyed Hashed Message Authentication Code with any of the hashing operations listed above	HMAC key	Execute
Random number generation	Generate random numbers	n2rng seed n2rng seed key swrand seed swrand seed key	Execute

**Table 4 – User Services**

Note that non-FIPS-Approved algorithms can also be used as part of these services, when the module is not operating in a FIPS-Approved mode.

### ***Physical Security***

Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework with SPARC T4 and T5 is a software-hybrid module, which FIPS defines as a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The module hardware is made up of production-grade components that include standard passivation techniques.

### ***Operational Environment***

The module operates as part of the Oracle Solaris 11.1 SRU3 and 11.1 SRU5.5 Operating System. The module is programmed to utilize SPARC special instructions sets for hardware-accelerated cryptography. The module has been tested on Oracle Solaris 11.1 SRU3 OS and Oracle Solaris 11.1 SRU5.5 OS, running on a T4-1 Server, using a SPARC T4 processor. Additionally, the module has been tested on Oracle Solaris 11.1 SRU3 OS and Oracle Solaris 11.1 SRU5.5 OS, running on a T5-2 Server, using a SPARC T5 processor. The processor shall be validated as part of the module.

The Crypto-Officer shall ensure that the OS is configured to a Single-User mode of operation. Each kernel process is the only user of the module, at the time it is requesting functionality from the module. Once the module has performed a service for that process, it is released to provide services to the next kernel

<sup>14</sup> HMAC – (Keyed-) Hash-based Message Authentication Code

process requesting services. There will be only one user of the module at any given time.

### *Cryptographic Key Management*

The module implements the following FIPS-approved algorithms:

Key or CSP	Certificate Number	
	v1.0	v1.1
<b>Symmetric Key</b>		
AES: ECB <sup>15</sup> , CBC <sup>16</sup> , CFB <sup>17</sup> -128, CCM <sup>18</sup> , GMAC <sup>19</sup> , GCM <sup>20</sup> and CTR <sup>21</sup> modes for 128, 192, and 256-bit key sizes	#2311	#2574
AES: XTS <sup>22</sup> mode for 256 and 512-bit key sizes	#2311	#2574
Triple DES: CBC and ECB mode for keying option I	#1458	#1560
<b>Asymmetric Key</b>		
RSA PKCS#1.5 signature generation/verification: 1024-, 2048-bit (w/ SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512)	#1194	#1321
ECDSA signature generation/verification: P-192, -224, -256, -384, -521; K-163, -233, -283, -409, -571; B-163, -233, -283, -409, -571	#376	#446
<b>Secure Hashing Standard (SHS)</b>		
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	#1994	#1994
<b>(Keyed-) Hash-based Message Authentication</b>		
HMAC SHA-1, HMAC SHA-224, HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, HMAC SHA-512	#1425	#1596
<b>Random Number Generators</b>		
swrand FIPS 186-2 Random Number Generator	#1154	#1222
n2rng FIPS 186-2 Random Number Generator	#1152	#1226

**Table 5 ± FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations**

**NOTE** NIST. Please refer to NIST Special Publication 800-131A for further details.

The use of key lengths providing 80 bits of security strength for digital signature generation is **deprecated** after December 31, 2010.

RSA (encrypt/decrypt, sign/verify operations) provides 80 or 112 bits of encryption strength, for 1024 or 2048-bit key sizes, respectively. RSA provides higher bits of encryption strength with higher key sizes.

<sup>15</sup> ECB ± Electronic Codebook

<sup>16</sup> CBC ± Cipher-Block Chaining

<sup>17</sup> CFB ± Cipher Feedback

<sup>18</sup> CCM ± Counter with CBC-MAC

<sup>19</sup> GMAC ± Galois Message Authentication Code

<sup>20</sup> GCM ± Galois/Counter Mode

<sup>21</sup> CTR ± Counter

<sup>22</sup> XTS ± Xor-encrypt-xor-based tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext stealing

- The use of RSA 1024-bit and SHA-1 for signature generation is **deprecated** from 2011 through 2013 and is **disallowed** after 2013 while the use of RSA 1024-bit and SHA-1 for signature verification is considered **legacy-use** after 2010.
- RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology) provides 80 or 112 bits of encryption strength, for 1024 or 2048-bit key sizes, respectively. RSA provides higher bits of encryption strength with higher key sizes; non-compliant with less than 80 bits of encryption strength.
- The use of the RNGs specified in FIPS 186-2 is **deprecated** from 2011 through December 31, 2015, and **disallowed** after 2015.

The module implements the following FIPS-Approved algorithm, however the implementation has not been validated and, as such, shall not be used in the FIPS-Approved mode of operation:

- Two-key Triple-DES

Additionally, the module implements the following non-FIPS-approved algorithms:

- MD4, MD5, HMAC MD5
- RC4<sup>23</sup>
- DES
- Blowfish
- AES CTS<sup>24</sup>, XCBC-MAC<sup>25</sup> – 128-, 192-, 256-bit
- RSA signature generation – 256-, 512-bit
- RSA signature verification – 256-, 512-bit

The CSPs that the module supports are listed in Table 6, below.

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<sup>23</sup> RC4 – Rivest Cipher 4

<sup>24</sup> CTS – Ciphertext Stealing

<sup>25</sup> XCBC-MAC – Extended Cipher-Block Chaining Message Authentication Code



Key or CSP	Key type	Generation	Output	Storage	Zeroization	Use
AES key	AES 128-, 192-, 256-bit key	Imported (passed as an attribute in an argument)	Output from the module through Data Output interface	Reference pointer stored in volatile memory during execution	Zeroized upon completion of operation	Symmetric encryption
AES GCM IV	Random data	Imported (passed as an attribute in an argument)	Never output from module	Reference Pointer Stored in volatile memory during execution	Zeroized upon completion of operation or reboot	IV input to AES GCM function
Triple DES key	Triple DES 168-bit key	Imported (passed as an attribute in an argument)	Output from the module through Data Output interface	Reference pointer stored in volatile memory during execution	Zeroized upon completion of operation	Symmetric encryption
RSA public key	RSA 1024-, 2048-, 4096-, 8192-bit key	Imported (passed as an attribute in an argument)	Output from module through Data Output interface	Reference pointer stored in volatile memory during execution	Zeroized upon completion of operation	Key wrapping, certificate generation, certificate verification, signature verification
RSA private key	RSA 1024-, 2048-, 4096-, 8192-bit key	Imported (passed as an attribute in an argument)	Output from module through Data Output interface	Reference pointer stored in volatile memory during execution	Zeroized upon completion of operation	Key wrapping, certificate generation, certificate verification, signature generation
RSA signature	RSA 1024-, 2048-, 4096-, 8192-bit signature	Imported (passed as an attribute in an argument)  Generated internally	Output from module through Data Output interface	Reference pointer stored in volatile memory during execution	Zeroized upon completion of operation	Signing data, signature verification
ECDSA public key	ECDSA 163-, 192-, 224-, 233-, 256-, 283-, 384-, 409-, 512-, 571-bit public key	Imported (passed as an attribute in an argument)	Output from module through Data Output interface	Reference pointer stored in volatile memory during execution	Zeroized upon completion of operation	Encrypting data, verifying signature

Key or CSP	Key type	Generation	Output	Storage	Zeroization	Use
ECDSA private key	ECDSA 163-, 192-, 224-, 233-, 256-, 283-, 384-, 409-, 512-, 571-bit private key	Imported (passed as an attribute in an argument)	Output from the module through Data Output interface	Reference pointer stored in volatile memory during execution	Zeroized upon completion of operation	Decrypting data, digitally signing data
HMAC key	HMAC secret key	Imported	Never output from module	Reference pointer stored in volatile memory during execution	Zeroized upon completion of operation	Message Integrity/Authentication
n2rng FIPS 186-2 Seed	20-byte Hexadecimal string	Generated internally	Never output from module	Plaintext in volatile memory	Zeroized upon completion of operation	To calculate SHA-1 string in FIPS 186-2 RNG <sup>26</sup>
n2rng FIPS 186-2 Seed Key	20-byte SHA-1 Digest	Generated internally	Never output from module	Plaintext in volatile memory	Zeroized upon completion of operation	To calculate SHA-1 string in FIPS 186-2 RNG
swrand FIPS 186-2 Seed	20-byte Hexadecimal string	Generated internally	Never output from module	Plaintext in volatile memory	Zeroized upon completion of operation	To calculate SHA-1 string in FIPS 186-2 RNG
swrand FIPS 186-2 Seed Key	20-byte SHA-1 Digest	Generated internally	Never output from module	Plaintext in volatile memory	Zeroized upon completion of operation	To calculate SHA-1 string in FIPS 186-2 RNG

**Table 6 - Listing of Key and Critical Security Parameters**

<sup>26</sup> RNG – Random Number Generator

## *Self-Tests*

In order to prevent any secure data from being released, it is important to test the cryptographic components of a security module to ensure all components are functioning correctly. To confirm correct functionality, the software library performs the following self-tests:

### *Power-Up Self-tests*

To confirm correct functionality, the software library performs the following self-tests:

- Software Integrity Test (HMAC SHA-1)
- Known Answer Tests (KATs)
  - AES KAT
  - Triple-DES KAT
  - RSA sign/verify KAT
  - SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 HMAC KAT
  - SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 KAT
  - swrand FIPS 186-2 RNG KAT
  - n2rng FIPS 186-2 RNG KAT
- Pairwise Consistency Tests
  - ECDSA signature generation/verification

### *Conditional Self-tests*

The Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework with SPARC T4 and T5 performs the following conditional self-tests:

- swrand FIPS 186-2 Continuous RNG test
- swrand Entropy Continuous RNG test
- n2rng FIPS 186-2 Continuous RNG test
- n2rng Entropy Continuous RNG test

Data output from the module is inhibited, while performing self-tests. Should any of the power-up self-tests or conditional self-tests fail, the modules will cease operation, inhibiting any further data output from the modules. The modules will need to reboot and perform power-up self-tests. Successful completion of the power-up self-tests will return the module to normal operation.

### ***Mitigation of Other Attacks***

This section is not applicable. The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-2 Level 1 requirements for this validation.

## SECURE OPERATION

The Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework with SPARC T4 and T5 meets Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below describe how to place and keep the module in a FIPS-approved mode of operation.

### *Initial Setup*

The first time that the Solaris operating system is booted, the Crypto-Officer must use `cryptoadm` to make the changes necessary to enable FIPS mode. The Crypto-Officer must use the “`cryptoadm enable <provider name> <mechanism list>`” command to enable the necessary providers.

The following provider list is to be used when enabling providers:

- `aes` – Provides AES algorithm support
- `des` – Provides Triple DES algorithm support
- `ecc` – Provides Elliptic-Curve DSA algorithm support
- `rsa` – Provides RSA algorithm support
- `md5` – Provides MD5 algorithm support (for TLS<sup>27</sup> purposes)
- `sha1` – Provides SHA-1 and HMAC SHA-1 algorithm support
- `sha2` – Provides SHA-2 and HMAC SHA-2 algorithm support
- `swrand` – Provides FIPS 186-2 RNG support
- `n2rng` – Provides FIPS 186-2 RNG support with hardware acceleration

Note that the use of MD5 is allowed in the TLS or DTLS<sup>28</sup> protocol only; MD5 shall not be used as a general hash function in an Approved mode of operation.

Next, the Crypto-Officer must create a new boot environment, using the “`beadm create <name>`” command, where the name is one provided by the Crypto-Officer. This creates a boot environment which is a clone of the currently running environment, to be used if there is a panic or other error with initialization. The Crypto-Officer must then input the command “`cryptoadm enable fips-140`”, in order to enable FIPS mode. The module must then be restarted by a full system reboot. Once the module loads, it will perform power-on cryptographic self-tests. Once all tests are successful, the module will begin to operate in a FIPS-Approved mode.

### *Crypto-Officer Guidance*

The Crypto-Officer is responsible for making sure the module is running in FIPS-Approved mode of operation and to ensure that only FIPS-Approved algorithms are utilized. The following algorithms and key sizes, provided by the module, cannot be used in FIPS-Approved mode of operation:

---

<sup>27</sup> TLS – Transport Layer Security

<sup>28</sup> DTLS – Datagram Transport Layer Security

- MD5 – For non-TLS uses
- HMAC MD5
- MD4
- RC4
- DES
- Blowfish
- 2-key Triple DES
- AES CTS, XCBC-MAC – 128-, 192-, 256-bit
- RSA signature generation – 256-, 512-bit
- RSA signature verification – 256-, 512-bit

### *Initialization*

It is the Crypto-Officer's responsibility to configure the module into the FIPS-Approved mode.

### *Management*

Using the commands available to the Crypto-Officer, outlined in Table 3, the cryptoadm utility can be used to configure and manage the module.

### *Zeroization*

All keys and CSPs are ephemeral. The module does not store any cryptographic keys, long-term. Removing power from the host appliance or unloading the module will zeroize all cryptographic keys and CSPs.

### *User Guidance*

It is the responsibility of the User kernel processes to ensure that only FIPS-Approved algorithms and providers are being utilized by their commands. The User is required to operate the module in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. In order to maintain FIPS-mode, the User must do the following:

- Only utilize the module interfaces to call FIPS-Approved algorithms

## ACRONYMS

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
API	Application Programming Interface
CBC	Cipher-Block Chaining
CCM	Counter with CBC-MAC
CFB	Cipher Feedback
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
CTR	Counter
CTS	Ciphertext Stealing
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DTLS	Datagram Transport Layer Security
DVD	Digital Versatile Disc
ECB	Electronic Codebook
ECC	Elliptic-Curve Cryptography
ECDSA	Elliptic-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ESP	Encapsulating Security Payload
FCC	Federal Communication Commission
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
GCM	Galois/Counter Mode
GMAC	Galois Message Authentication Code
GPC	General Purpose Computer
HD	High Density
HMAC	(Keyed-) Hash-based Message Authentication Code
KAT	Known Answer Test
LED	Light Emitting Diode
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MD5	Message Digest Algorithm 5
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OS	Operating System
PKCS	Public Key Cryptography Standards
RC4	Rivest Cipher 4
RCI	Remote Cabinet Interface
RJ	Registered Jack
RNG	Random Number Generator
RSA	Rivest Shamir and Adleman
SAS	Small Computer System Interface-Assisted Storage
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SPARC	Scalable Processor Architecture
TLS	Transport Layer Security
UPC	Usage Parameter Control
USB	Universal Serial Bus
VGA	Video Graphics Array
XCBC-MAC	Extended Cipher-Block Chaining Message Authentication Code

XTS

Xor-encrypt-xor-based tweaked-codebook mode  
with ciphertext stealing